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Notes 
THE QUINTESSENTIAL EMPLOYER’S 
DILEMMA:  COMBATING TITLE VII 
LITIGATION BY MEETING THE ELUSIVE 
STRONG BASIS IN EVIDENCE STANDARD 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Publicus Corporation issues an objective assessment to 
determine qualified candidates for a promotion and plans to promote the 
top ten highest scoring candidates.1  To the corporation‘s dismay, the test 
results reveal that the top ten scoring candidates were all white males, 
although nearly half of the test takers were minorities.  Publicus 
Corporation now faces a dilemma.  Should Publicus promote the 
candidates who scored the highest or should Publicus discard the test?  If 
Publicus Corporation keeps the test, it will likely face disparate impact 
litigation by minority candidates who will argue that, although neutral 
on its face, the test was discriminatory in effect under Title VII.  If the 
corporation discards the test, the white employees will argue that 
Publicus engaged in disparate treatment against them, subjecting the 
corporation to litigation under Title VII.  This is the dilemma that 
employers frequently face today if promotional and hiring tests result in 
a disproportionate number of minority candidates failing the tests.  Most 
recently, the Supreme Court held that fear of litigation alone cannot 
justify an employer‘s use of race-based measures.2  Instead, the employer 
must have a strong basis in evidence for believing that it would have 
been liable under the disparate impact statute had it not taken remedial 
race-based measures.3  It is exceptionally difficult, however, for an 
employer to satisfy the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard.4 
This Note will discuss the history of Title VII and the ―strong basis in 
evidence‖ standard in cases of disparate impact litigation and will 
provide recommendations to ameliorate any current inconsistencies.5  
Recently, the Supreme Court amplified the uncertainty surrounding the 
―strong basis in evidence‖ standard by finding that statistics are not 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical scenario was created by the author to illustrate the potential impact 
of Title VII on employers who use testing to determine candidates for promotion. 
2 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). 
3 Id. at 2662. 
4 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the strong basis in evidence standard). 
5 See infra Part III.B (providing model judicial reasoning to ascertain the likely 
requirements of the strong basis in evidence standard). 
Hoodhood: The Quintessential Employer's Dilemma:  Combating Title VII Litig
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
112 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.6  The purpose of 
this Note is to advocate amending Title VII to clearly establish what 
constitutes disparate impact and what remedial action employers should 
implement when faced with the likelihood of disparate impact 
litigation.7  Part II of this Note focuses on the history of Title VII and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.8  Part III identifies 
problems associated with the statutory provisions of Title VII and the 
difficulty for courts to achieve a uniform standard of analysis under the 
―strong basis in evidence‖ standard—a constitutional standard 
borrowed from Equal Protection analysis.9  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
modified standard of analysis, as well as amendments to both the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission regulations and to Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
After the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
employers were no longer allowed to engage in intentional 
discriminatory employment practices based on an individual‘s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.11  The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖) was created under Title VII to 
prevent such unlawful employment practices and has the authority to 
file lawsuits on behalf of aggrieved employees.12  In response to several 
unfavorable employment discrimination decisions, Congress amended 
Title VII in 1991 to include a disparate impact provision.13  The provision 
makes it unlawful for an employer to engage in any employment 
practice that has a disparate impact based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin unless the employer could validate its test as job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.14 
                                                 
6 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662. 
7 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to Title VII and the Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures). 
8 See infra Part II (presenting the history of Title VII and discussing the impact equal 
protection has had on Title VII litigation). 
9 See infra Part III (analyzing the Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection 
Procedures, the strong basis in evidence standard, and the disparate impact and disparate 
treatment provisions of Title VII). 
10 See infra Part IV (discussing the need to reform the strong basis in evidence standard 
and revise Title VII). 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (defining unlawful employment practices). 
12 See id. (stating that the Commission has the power to prevent any person from 
engaging in unlawful employment practices). 
13 See id. § 2000e-2(k) (containing the disparate impact provision). 
14 See id. (providing the disparate impact provision created under Title VII).  See generally 
Michael T. Kirkpatrick, Class and Collective Actions in Employment Law:  Symposium Editors:  
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Part II discusses the background of Title VII, the problems that have 
arisen since its enactment, and the standard that employers must meet to 
justify their employment practices.15  Specifically, Part II.A discusses the 
rationale for Title VII and the protection it provides for minorities.16  Part 
II.B outlines the history of the EEOC and discusses the purpose behind 
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.17  Part II.C 
discusses the development of the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard, 
the burden it creates for employers, and the attempt by circuit courts to 
define and apply the standard.18 
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The initial purpose behind Title VII was to prevent disparate 
treatment.19  A growing concern that employee testing and other 
employment practices were having a discriminatory effect on minority 
candidates led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made 
the use of a non-validated test that resulted in disparate impact 
unlawful.20  Employers who feared disparate impact litigation would 
                                                                                                             
Douglas D. Scherer and Robert Belton:  Employment Testing: Trends and Tactics, 10 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL‘Y J. 623, 626 (2006) (discussing that disparate impact occurs when employers use a 
facially neutral employment practice that disproportionately affects protected class 
members); James M. Conway, Note, Title VII and Competitive Testing, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
299, 302 (1987) (explaining that intent to discriminate is not required to establish disparate 
impact). 
15 See infra Part II (discussing why Title VII was enacted, the history and purpose of the 
EEOC, and the establishment of the strong basis in evidence standard—a standard that an 
employer must meet to prove that a remedial action undertaken was necessary to avoid 
litigation). 
16 See infra Part II.A (explaining why Title VII was enacted and the protection it 
provides). 
17 See infra Part II.B (describing the EEOC and the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures). 
18 See infra Part II.C (presenting the history of the strong basis in evidence standard and 
the approaches the circuit courts have taken in applying the standard in cases of disparate 
impact). 
19 See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose behind Title VII 
was to prevent disparate treatment, which occurs when minorities are overtly 
discriminated against in the workforce); see also Janice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and 
Reverse Discrimination:  The Prima Facie Case, 31 IND. L. REV. 413, 415 n.18 (1998) (quoting 110 
CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (―Title VII was intended to cover ‗white 
men and white women and all Americans.‘‖); 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964) (memorandum of 
Sen. Clark) (―Title VII creates an ‗obligation not to discriminate against whites.‘‖)) 
(explaining that the legislative history of Title VII shows Congress intended it to cover all 
employees, not just minorities). 
20 See infra note 54 (defining disparate impact as a form of unintentional discrimination 
that occurs when employment tests and practices yield a lower than expected number of 
minority candidates). 
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often institute remedial measures to avoid litigation.21  However, they 
faced the possibility that this might subject them to reverse 
discrimination claims.22  Employers continue to struggle with the 
predicament of avoiding disparate impact litigation without facing 
liability for reverse discrimination.23 
1. The Initial Purpose of Title VII:  Preventing Disparate Treatment 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for an 
employer to deliberately refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against 
an individual based on the individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.24  The enactment of Title VII by Congress purported to 
mandate equal employment opportunities by prohibiting barriers that 
operated to favor the selection of white employees over minorities. 25  
However, Congress did not intend to guarantee a job to every person 
regardless of his or her qualifications merely because he or she had 
minority status.26  Disparate treatment situations occur when an 
                                                 
21 See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (explaining how fear of disparate impact 
litigation led many employers to engage in banding of test scores, granting preferences to 
minorities, and race norming). 
22 See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing that the use of preferences 
and race norming as remedial measures often led to reverse discrimination claims). 
23 See infra Part II.C (introducing the strong basis in evidence standard and its effect on 
employers). 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (stating what constitutes unlawful employment 
practices).  Unlawful employment practices are defined as follows: 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual‘s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id.; see also Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of 
its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 305 (1996) (providing an 
overview of Title VII).  But see Stephen Plass, Reinforcing Title VII with Zero Tolerance Rules, 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 127, 130 (2005) (arguing that Title VII fails to combat employment 
discrimination and fosters resentment and opposition from white workers). 
25 Conway, supra note 14, at 300 (explaining the goal behind Title VII was to eliminate 
discriminatory employment preferences and establish fair employment practices). 
26 Anna S. Rominger & Pamela Sandoval, Employee Testing:  Reconciling the Twin Goals of 
Productivity and Fairness, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 299, 307 (1998) (discussing Title VII and 
employment testing).  By enacting Title VII, Congress sought to ―remove artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that served to discriminate on the basis 
of race or other impermissible classifications.‖  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 6
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employee is intentionally treated less favorably than other employees in 
areas such as compensation, contract terms, conditions, promotions, or 
privileges because of his or her minority status.27 
In addition to disparate treatment claims, employees may also seek 
redress for disparate impact under Title VII.28  Disparate impact 
discrimination is the use of a facially neutral employment practice that 
has a disproportional effect on minorities and that cannot be justified by 
business necessity.29  By codifying disparate impact, Congress intended 
to eliminate specific practices such as employment tests that perpetuated 
past intentional discrimination.30 
2. Employee Testing and Disparate Impact 
In the 1950‘s, employers began using standardized tests to gather 
data about prospective employees and potential candidates for 
promotions.31  Employers preferred standardized tests because they 
                                                 
27 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973) (examining a case 
where a black civil rights activist claimed that his discharge had been racially motivated, 
and he sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Brian H. Alligood, Proof 
of Racial Discrimination in Employment Promotion Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 48 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 75 § 5 (1988) (stating that Title VII applies to 
employers that ―employ at least fifteen employees for a twenty or more week period in the 
present or preceding calendar year‖). 
28 See Alligood, supra note 27 (explaining that disparate impact and disparate treatment 
are the two main types of discrimination classifications under Title VII). 
29 See, e.g., Int‘l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977) 
(explaining that disparate impact involves ―employment practices that are facially neutral 
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity‖); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 430 (1971) (emphasizing that discriminatory employment tests cannot be maintained 
under Title VII, even if the tests are facially neutral); see also Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. 
DeStefano:  End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road? 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 201, 201 (2009) (explaining that disparate impact discrimination is the use 
of facially neutral employment practices that have a discriminatory effect on protected class 
members). 
30 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake? 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705 
(2006) (explaining the disparate impact theory initially arose to deal with employment 
practices that were perpetuating past intentional discrimination).  Selmi asserts that 
―[g]iven the vast inequities in school education systems among white and black 
schoolchildren, imposing written tests as a condition of employment predictably would 
have the effect of perpetuating segregated job classifications.‖  Id. at 714. 
31 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 301 (discussing the initial employee 
screening techniques used by employers).  Traditionally, employers relied primarily on 
reference checks and job interviews to gain information about applicants for job and 
promotion slots.  Id.  However, these techniques failed to provide adequate information 
regarding employee productivity.  Id.; see also David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later:  Where 
Do We Stand on Equal Opportunity Law Enforcement? 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1177 (1989) 
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provided better information about employees and because they 
produced greater efficiency in selection methods.32  Employers‘ use of 
such tests increased for two reasons.33  First, they believed the tests were 
an objective measure that could efficiently rank test-takers based on their 
level of performance.34  Second, employers found that standardized 
employment tests more reliably predicted job performance than 
traditional methods of gathering data.35  In many cases, employers relied 
exclusively on test scores for employee selection.36  Unfortunately, this 
disproportionately excluded women and minority candidates from being 
hired and promoted, which increased the likelihood that a disparate 
impact claim would be raised.37 
3. The Foundational Case for Disparate Impact:  Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. 
The Court established the theory of disparate impact in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.38  In Griggs, a company implemented a policy requiring a 
high school education for initial assignment into any department other 
                                                                                                             
(explaining that standardized ability tests are commonly used for education and hiring 
decisions). 
32 See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality:  Merits, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1251, 1256–57 (1995) (analyzing the relationship between 
employment testing and affirmative action in employment).  Efficiency concerns typically 
emerge when there are too many applicants for a limited number of positions, which 
makes screening of individual applicants impractical.  Id. at 1256.  To resolve efficiency 
concerns, employers use employment tests to differentiate among the available candidates.  
Id.  Employment tests are useful to the extent that they measure productivity and provide 
reliable differentiating information.  Id. at 1257. 
33 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 303 (examining the increasing use of 
employment testing procedures). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See Selmi, supra note 32, at 1258 (discussing employer reliance on employment testing 
to determine candidates for hire and promotion). 
37 Id.  Disparate impact occurs when: 
[M]embers of a protected group—whether they be African-American, 
Hispanic, women, or the aged—perform significantly less well on an 
examination than the majority group, which is typically white men.  
Adverse impact can be demonstrated in a number of ways, such as by 
comparing pass rates to determine whether whites pass the test at a 
higher rate than African-Americans, or by looking to the actual hiring 
(or promotion) rates of employees.  In any event, when employment 
tests have significant adverse impact, employers may face costly and 
protracted legal challenges, and their efforts toward workplace 
diversity may be frustrated. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
38 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
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than the Department of Labor.39  The company subsequently mandated 
that new employees achieve satisfactory scores on two professionally 
prepared aptitude tests to qualify for placement into a department other 
than Labor.40  African American employees at the company brought an 
action under Title VII, alleging that the company‘s promotional and 
hiring requirements of a high school diploma and a passing score on two 
professionally prepared aptitude tests had a discriminatory effect on 
them.41  The Court found that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, ―practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even 
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‗freeze‘ 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.‖42  The 
Court held that employers are prohibited from using employment tests 
that, even though neutral on their face, act to disqualify minorities at a 
substantially higher rate than non-minorities where such tests are not 
shown to be significantly related to job performance and consistent with 
                                                 
39 Id. at 427. 
40 Id.  The Labor Department was the lowest paying department, making it the least 
desirable.  Id. 
41 Id. at 425; see Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 260 (1993) (describing the case of Griggs).  Griggs 
was decided during a time when employment requirements were covertly serving to 
inhibit diversity in the workforce: 
The consequence of these requirements was predictable given the 
social reality at the time.  African-Americans graduated from high 
school far less often than whites.  Suffering from the lingering effects of 
an inferior segregated educational system, their performance on the 
tests was comparatively even worse.  Duke Power‘s use of the 
educational and testing criteria thus served to continue to confine 
African-Americans to the same dead-end jobs to which the company 
had always relegated them. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Selmi, supra note 30, at 755–56 (discussing the impact of 
written examinations).  Selmi explains: 
Most written examinations today continue to have substantial 
disparate impact; what has changed is that the tests are better 
constructed, in the sense that they are harder to challenge in court 
because they have been properly validated, but not better in the more 
important sense of being better predictors of performance.  The ability 
to predict success in employment, or academic potential, has not 
improved much in the last thirty years as most written tests have the 
same modest ability to predict performance today as they did at the 
time of the Griggs case.  And despite the many challenges to written 
tests, testing is more prevalent today, not less. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
42 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.  See generally David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing 
Protected Class:  Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 672 (2000) (providing, in part, an analysis of Griggs and its effect on 
employers). 
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business necessity.43  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio weakened the 
Griggs decision:  by holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving a 
lack of business justification, Wards Cove made it more difficult for 
employees to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.44  In 
addition to disparate impact litigation, employers also encountered 
reverse discrimination suits.45 
4. Reverse Discrimination 
Reverse discrimination, generally regarded as discrimination against 
dominant class members (white males) in favor of historically 
disadvantaged groups, can occur when an employer undertakes a 
voluntary affirmative action plan to remedy an employment practice that 
has a disproportionate effect on minority candidates.46  If employers take 
action to remedy these disparities at the expense of dominant class 
members, they are engaging in reverse discrimination.47  Employers 
primarily use three different race-conscious methods to increase 
minority employment in their workforce:  banding of test scores, 
granting preferences to minorities, and race norming.48  Consolidating 
                                                 
43 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
44 460 U.S. 642, 659 (1989); see 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 5:35 (2009) (discussing the impact of Wards on 
plaintiffs, which imposes on the plaintiffs the responsibility for identifying specific 
employment practices that allegedly are responsible for the disparate impact).  The Court 
reasoned it would not be difficult for plaintiffs to identify potentially discriminatory 
employment practices because the EEOC Uniform Guidelines required employers to keep 
records regarding the selection process they used.  Id. 
45 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 322 (explaining how disparate impact 
affected employment testing and led to an increase in the number of reverse discrimination 
suits being filed against employers by disgruntled white employees).  The discovery that 
even professionally constructed employment tests could have an adverse impact on 
minorities led some employers to compensate by adjusting minority scores.  Id.  Ultimately, 
Congress responded to the increase in reverse discrimination suits by enacting Title I of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which outlawed racial preferences such as favorably adjusting test 
scores of minorities or using different test cutoffs for different races.  Id. at 327–28. 
46 See Selmi, supra note 32, at 1259 (explaining disparate impact affected employment 
testing and led to an increase in the number of reverse discrimination suits being filed 
against employers by white employees). 
47 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780, 861 
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., embracing the ―colorblind‖ mentality that discrimination against both 
protected and dominant class members is unlawful); see also Selmi, supra note 32, at 1259 
(defining reverse discrimination).  Employers who take affirmative action in order to 
address a test‘s adverse impact might do so to avoid the costs of potential litigation, or an 
employer might be motivated by political or social pressure.  Selmi, supra note 32, at 1259. 
48 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 322 (discussing the different race-
conscious measures used by employers who seek to increase the number of minorities in 
their labor pool). 
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test scores into bands or ranges allows employers to group a certain 
range of scores together and treats differences between scores within the 
band as statistically insignificant.49  Race preferential test scoring adjusts 
test results or gives outright preference to minorities.50  Such a practice is 
reverse discrimination unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
plan corrects a ―manifest imbalance‖ in the employer‘s workforce.51  
Race norming is ―the practice of adjusting minority employment test 
scores so that a minority test-taker‘s score is based on a comparison with 
other test-takers of the same race instead of with the general population 
of test-takers.‖52  Although banding is still permissible, ―[t]he Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 directly prohibit[s] employers from favorably 
adjusting test scores of minorities or using differential test cutoffs by 
race.‖53 
                                                 
49 See Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(upholding banding as a valid affirmative action practice); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. 
Comm‘n, 979 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of 
Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1148 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).  See generally Rominger & Sandoval, 
supra note 26, at 322 (describing the effects of banding and discussing circuit court cases 
where banding was used). 
50 See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1258 (7th Cir. 1989).  The City, not 
satisfied with the results of a police promotional exam, altered the scores so that black and 
Hispanic test takers scored higher.  Id.  Female police officers filed a reverse discrimination 
case alleging that the City had altered the test scores to give African American candidates 
preference.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit allowed the female officers to proceed with the suit.  Id. 
at 1264. 
51 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 324 (discussing race preferential test 
scoring); see also Linda M. Braye, Note, Local No. 93, International Association of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland:  Does Voluntary Compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Necessarily Entail Reverse Discrimination? 30 HOW. L.J. 875, 875–76 (1987) (noting that some 
voluntary affirmative action plans have resulted in reverse discrimination suits against 
employers).  Compliance with Title VII remains a problem for employers because of the 
uncertainty surrounding what constitutes a proper condition for voluntary, race-conscious 
affirmative action.  Braye, supra at 885. 
52 Emily Prescott, The General Aptitude Test Battery and the Debate Over Race Norming, 
Racial Preference, and Affirmative Action, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 877, 878 (1993) (footnotes 
omitted).  The mechanics of race norming involves converting the raw scores of the General 
Aptitude Test Battery (a federal employment test that measures basic skills) into percentile 
scores within the categories of black, Hispanic, and other.  Id. at 881.  The percentile scores 
were then forwarded to both public and private employers.  Id. 
53 See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 327.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has not 
outlawed all affirmative action programs or race-conscious selection methods.  Id.  Banding 
is one of the few legitimate race-conscious devices that employers are allowed to use to 
amend the adverse effect of employment testing.  Id.  But see Mark Kelman, Concepts of 
Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1198 (1991) (arguing 
that general ability tests are not highly predictive of job performance and such tests 
continue to burden members of historically oppressed groups).  Kelmin argues that ―race-
norming of tests should be an adequate solution for individualists seeking reparations, 
because it enables minority workers to be hired in proportion to their application rates.‖  Id. 
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5. Disparate Impact Codified Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Congress codified disparate impact liability by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.54  The Act overruled several Supreme Court decisions 
that Congress regarded as negatively affecting disparate impact law.55  
Clarifying disparate impact as an unlawful employment practice, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII.56  To avoid disparate-impact 
litigation, employers attempted to use race-conscious remedies; 
however, implementation of such remedies negatively affected non-
minority candidates who brought reverse discrimination and disparate 
treatment suits.57  Since the protection of Title VII extends to both 
                                                 
54 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006) (codifying disparate impact).  The burden of proof 
for disparate impact is stated as follows: 
 (k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases. 
 (1)(A)  An unlawful employment practice based on disparate 
impact is established under this subchapter only if— 
 (i)  a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent 
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
 (ii)  the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice 
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment 
practice. 
Id.; see also Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515, 527 (2007) (―Section 703(k) of Title VII was added by the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, and embodies congressional recognition of both the existence of 
disparate impact liability and the defense an employer has to a plaintiff‘s prima facie case 
of disparate impact.‖); Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts and a Defense of 
the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677, 
2687 (2004) (explaining that under Title VII, a plaintiff may prove disparate impact if he or 
she can demonstrate that an impermissible classification was used that the defendant 
cannot justify as being job-related and consistent with business necessity). 
55 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) 
(explaining that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overrule Supreme Court 
cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which negatively changed the existing precedent on 
employment discrimination law established by Griggs).  Arguably, the passage of the Act 
served to restore Griggs, which reinstated that employers have the burden of 
demonstrating both job-relatedness and business necessity in disparate impact claims.  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra; see also BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 44, § 5:35 
(explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 mitigates the ―harshness‖ of the holding in 
Atonio). 
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006) (codifying disparate impact and the burden of 
proof in disparate impact cases). 
57 See id. (codifying disparate treatment).  Providing that unlawful employment practices 
include the following: 
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minorities and white class members, employers now face the dilemma of 
how to rectify an employment practice that results in a disparate impact 
without inadvertently engaging in disparate treatment or reverse 
discrimination.58 
                                                                                                             
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1)  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
 (2)  to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual‘s race, color 
religion sex, or national origin. 
Id. § 2000e-2(a); see also Whiteside, supra note 19, at 415 (discussing that a considerable 
number of claims filed under Title VII have involved reverse discrimination); Schwartz, 
supra note 42, at 661 (discussing that the hardest cases for courts to decide are those of 
reverse discrimination in which ―the rights of ‗innocent whites‘—those who have not 
themselves been found to have discriminated—may be unduly ‗trammeled‘ by a remedy 
for minority victims of discrimination‖).  Schwartz explains that: 
Reverse discrimination cases have arisen in three situations.  First, a 
white (or male) employee or applicant complains that a minority (or 
female) employee or applicant received preferential treatment on the 
basis of race or gender pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action plan.  
In a second setting, typically in employment, a white/male employee 
challenges involuntary affirmative action:  a court-ordered remedy that 
results in some preferential treatment to compensate minority/female 
employees for judicially proven discrimination. . . . In a third setting, 
the complaining white/male employee alleges only that the 
minority/female employee was treated more favorably; there is not 
necessarily an affirmative action plan or even a ―benign‖ motivation. 
Id. at 662 (footnote omitted). 
58 See Patricia L. Donze, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Dallas Fire Fighters 
Leaves Unsettled the Standard for Compelling Remedial Interests, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 759, 
776–79 (2000) (explaining the typical legal problem faced by employers who engage in 
affirmative action programs): 
On one hand, they have the possibility that minority plaintiffs will sue 
for racial discrimination in hiring, promotions, curriculum, etc. On the 
other hand, they have the possibility that non-minority plaintiffs will 
sue for a job, promotion, or benefit they expected but did not receive 
because of a remedial program. 
Id. at 779.  But see Whiteside, supra note 19, at 440 (arguing that it would be illogical to 
impose different requirements on dominant class members who were historically favored 
because the Court no longer views the history of discrimination to be the underlying 
rationale of Title VII).  See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (holding 
that fear of disparate impact litigation alone cannot justify an employer‘s decision to 
engage in disparate treatment); Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 179 Fed. Appx. 366, 377 
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the City had a strong basis in evidence for its remedial actions, 
thereby defeating reverse discrimination and disparate treatment claims by white police 
officers). 
Hoodhood: The Quintessential Employer's Dilemma:  Combating Title VII Litig
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
122 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the concepts of ―business 
necessity‖ and ―job-relatedness‖ that Griggs introduced.59  To establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the Act, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the employer used a particular employment practice 
that results in a disparate impact based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.60  A plaintiff showing a statistical disparate impact can 
establish a prima facie case.61  Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
                                                 
59 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 14, at 625 (providing a background and analysis of the 
disparate impact theory).  See also Conway, supra note 14, at 308 (explaining employer 
defenses when faced with disparate impact liability).  An employer may justify his or her 
business practice by showing that such practice was job related-related and a business 
necessity.  Id.  There are three elements to the business necessity defense:  ―(1) the business 
necessity must override the social harm which results from the discrimination; (2) the 
employment practice must fulfill the necessary purpose it is alleged to serve; and (3) there 
must be no alternative practice which would better fulfill this need.‖  Id.  The job-related 
defense is typically reserved for cases involving employment tests and requires that the 
employer establish that the tasks being tested are essential for actual job performance.  Id. 
at 309.  Therefore, as a matter of policy, an employer can use an employment test, but only 
if it can adequately measure job performance.  Id.  See generally Michael Carvin, Disparate 
Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1993) (focusing on 
the burden that an employer bears in responding to a disparate impact claim). 
60 Kirkpatrick, supra note 14, at 626; see also Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2683 (recalling that 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was the landmark case where the Supreme Court developed the 
theory of disparate impact, which provided that a plaintiff could prove employment 
discrimination using statistical evidence of disparate effects without demonstrating that 
there was an intent to discriminate).  In Griggs, the Court laid out the framework for 
disparate impact liability.  Id. at 2684.  This framework consists of two stages—the first 
stage being the plaintiffs‘ prima facie case, where plaintiff must show that a hiring or 
promotion requirement has a discriminatory effect on the basis of race or some other 
impermissible classification.  Id.  If plaintiff is successful in showing a prima facie case, then 
the burden shifts to the defendant employer to prove that the employment practice was 
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.  Id.  
However, even if the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff may win by proving that 
there is another employment practice available that does not have a discriminatory effect 
and that the employer failed to adopt it.  Id. at 2688.  But see Nelson Lund, The Law of 
Affirmative Action in and After the Civil Rights Act of 1991:  Congress Invites Judicial Reform, 6 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 87, 100 (1997) (noting the more immediate effect of Griggs was to set 
up a kind of Catch-22 for employers in that the only way for employers to protect 
themselves from disparate impact liability was to ensure that their workforce was racially 
balanced; however, if employers took steps to get their numbers ―right,‖ they exposed 
themselves to lawsuits for intentional discrimination by white employees). 
61 See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 
IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2009) (explaining that statistics are the plaintiffs‘ key evidence in 
establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact).  The two primary statistical methods 
used by plaintiffs are the statistical significance and the four-fifths rule.  Id.  Under the four-
fifths rule, a disparity is actionable if one group‘s pass rate is less than four-fifths of another 
group‘s pass rate.  Id.  ―Under statistical significance tests, a disparity is actionable when 
we can be confident at a specified level—generally ninety-five percent—that the observed 
disparity is not due to random chance.‖  Id.  ―The Supreme Court has rejected a ‗rigid 
mathematical formula‘ for disparate impact, providing instead the ambiguous guidance to 
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case, the burden then shifts to the employer to show, as an affirmative 
defense, that its employment practice is job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.62  When faced with disparate impact litigation, the 
employer has both the burden of production and the burden of 
persuasion in establishing business necessity.63  The most practical way 
for plaintiffs and employers to gauge whether disparate impact has 
occurred is to consult the EEOC‘s Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures.64 
                                                                                                             
lower courts that ‗statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise . . . an 
inference of causation.‘‖  Id. at 778.  See generally Kirkpatrick, supra note 14, at 627 (―If a 
disparity in the outcome of a test for one group as compared to another is statistically 
significant, one can conclude . . . the observed disparity is not due to chance, but is 
associated with race, sex, national origin, or some other prohibited factor.‖); Sleiman, supra 
note 54, at 2689 (providing a brief history of the disparate impact doctrine and its 
development). 
62 Kirkpatrick, supra note 14, at 626 (describing the prima facie case of disparate impact); 
see also Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale:  The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate 
Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 317 (1998) 
(―Unlike disparate treatment defendants, disparate impact defendants cannot defend by 
disavowing discriminatory intent.  Instead, a disparate impact defendant must establish 
that a challenged practice is justified by a business necessity—i.e., that it constitutes a 
‗demonstrably . . . reasonable measure of job performance.‘‖).  Furthermore, a disparate 
impact defendant must show that his or her employment practice is job related in the sense 
that the practice predicts an individual‘s ability to perform the job in question.  Id. at 355. 
63 See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2009) 
(stating the burdens of proof); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) 
(―Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement 
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.‖); see also Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 14, at 626 (explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified Griggs by making 
it clear that the employer has both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion 
in establishing business necessity).  See generally Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less 
Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1623 
(describing the basic burden-shifting steps in a disparate impact claim).  Explaining the 
process: 
First, the plaintiff needed to make a prima facie showing of disparate 
impact by presenting statistical evidence that a particular employment 
practice of the defendant had an adverse impact on an identifiable 
group.  Such evidence created a presumption of discrimination that the 
defendant could rebut by proving that the practice in question was job-
related and served a necessary business purpose.  Finally, if the 
defendant [were] successful, the plaintiff could overcome the 
defendant‘s proof of business necessity by presenting a less 
discriminatory alternative (―LDA‖) that would ―show that other tests 
or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, 
would also serve the employer‘s legitimate interest.‖ 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
64 See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (discussing the purpose of the Guidelines); Kirkpatrick, 
supra note 14, at 627 (discussing how employees and employers can consult the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures to calculate if a disparity is statistically 
significant so as to constitute a prima facie showing of disparate impact liability). 
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B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
The EEOC, established under Title VII, investigates complaints of 
alleged disparate impact, disparate treatment, and discrimination in 
business establishments, labor unions, and employment agencies.65  Title 
VII creates a statutory defense to discrimination claims for employers 
who rely on a written opinion or interpretation of the EEOC.66  The 
EEOC‘s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 
(―Guidelines‖) are intended to serve as a guide for employers.67  They 
provide standards for determining the lawfulness of tests administered 
in a nondiscriminatory manner.68  They require employers to validate 
                                                 
65 See Braye, supra note 51, at 584 (providing a background of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 in addition to a history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); 
see also Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Opinions in Professional 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 HOW. L.J. 723, 730 (1983) (discussing the EEOC and the 
applicability of the Uniform Guidelines).  The EEOC was established with the passage of 
Title VII and is the administrative agency responsible for interpreting and implementing 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Howard-Martin, supra, at 730.  The 
EEOC has promulgated a series of regulations, definitions, and guidelines to encourage 
compliance with, and enable uniform application of, the requirements of Title VII.  Id.  In 
Griggs, the Court held that the interpretations of the EEOC were entitled to considerable 
deference.  Id. 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 713(b) (2006) (providing affirmative defenses to discrimination claims 
under Title VII); see also BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 44, § 5:47 (explaining 
reliance on EEOC interpretation or opinion provides a statutory defense for employers 
―even where the interpretation is subsequently modified or rescinded or determined by 
judicial authority to be invalid or not in conformity with the requirements of the Act‖). 
67 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1.  The intent of the Guidelines is as follows: 
[t]hese guidelines incorporate a single set of principles which are 
designed to assist employers, labor organizations, employment 
agencies, and licensing and certification boards to comply with 
requirements of Federal law prohibiting employment practices which 
discriminate on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.  They are designed to provide a framework for determining 
proper use of tests and other selection procedures.  These guidelines 
do not require a user to conduct validity studies of selection 
procedures where no adverse impact results.  However, all users are 
encouraged to use selection procedures which are valid, especially 
users operating under merit principles. 
Id.  See generally Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689 (explaining how the EEOC Guidelines 
regard cases of disparate impact). 
68 See 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 49 (1974).  Under the Guidelines codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3: 
a test is unlawful if it ‗adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer or 
any other employment opportunity of classes protected by title VII,‘ 
unless it can be shown that the test has been validated in accordance 
with procedures set forth in the guidelines and the employer ‗can 
demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion 
procedures are unavailable for his use.‘  As the ‗Guidelines‘ are 
worded and have been interpreted by the Courts, a showing that 
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any selection procedure that has an adverse impact on the hiring or 
promotion of minorities; moreover, the Guidelines recommend that all 
employers validate their employment tests in accordance with Guideline 
procedures.69  Although the Guidelines do not define a precise method 
for calculating disparities between minority and dominant class 
members, they imply an adverse impact if the selection rate for any 
minority group is less than ―four-fifths‖ (eighty percent) of the rate for 
the group with the highest rate (typically white candidates).70  Validation 
under the Guidelines requires a test to demonstrate a significant 
correlation to important elements of work behavior, which should reveal 
a relationship between test performance and job performance.71  The 
                                                                                                             
members of a protected class are adversely affected by the use of the 
test [establishes] a prima facie case that the test is unlawful. 
Id.; see also Mark J. Simeon, Symposium, Title VII Defenses:  An Overview, 27 HOW. L.J. 479, 
486–87 (1984) (explaining that the Uniform Guidelines, which were developed by the 
American Psychological Association, provide three legally sufficient methods by which the 
job-relatedness of a test may be established:  construct validity, content validity, and 
criterion-related validity). 
69 See Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970), 
withdrawn, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1978) (providing employers with procedures for 
determining whether an employment test was job-related). 
70 See 29 C.F.R. 1607.4(D) (discussing adverse impact and the ―four-fifths rule‖); see 
Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689 (―Under the four-fifths rule, if the pass rate for a particular 
group is less than eighty percent of the pass rate for others, this difference in pass rates 
presents evidence of a disparate impact.‖).  For example: 
If one hundred men took the running test and seventy-five of these 
men passed the test, the men would have a pass rate of seventy-five 
percent.  If 100 women took the running test and fifty of them passed 
the test, the pass rate for these women would be fifty percent.  The 
pass rate of women (fifty percent) would therefore be sixty-six percent 
of the pass rate for men (seventy-five percent).  The pass rate of 
women is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the pass rate for 
men. Therefore, these statistics show evidence of a disparate impact 
under the EEOC‘s four-fifths rule. 
Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689–90; see also Doreen Canton, Comment, Adverse Impact 
Analysis of Public Sector Employment Tests:  Can a City Devise a Valid Test?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 
683, 688 (1987) (explaining that proof of a prima facie case of adverse impact by plaintiffs is 
most frequently employed using the four-fifths rule set out in the EEOC Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures). 
71 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (evaluating use of selection rates). Stating that: 
If the information . . . shows that the total selection process for a job 
has an adverse impact, the individual components of the selection 
process should be evaluated for adverse impact.  If this information 
shows that the total selection process does not have an adverse impact, 
the Federal enforcement agencies, in the exercise of their 
administrative and prosecutorial discretion, in usual circumstances, 
will not expect a user to evaluate the individual components for 
adverse impact, or to validate such individual components, and will 
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Guidelines provide three methods employers can use to demonstrate the 
validity of a testing program:  criterion-related, content-related, and 
construct-related validity studies.72  The Guidelines provide insight on 
employment procedures and test validation, but they do not define the 
―strong basis in evidence‖ standard—the new burden of proof imposed 
by the 2009 Ricci case, which requires employers to demonstrate a strong 
basis that the remedial action undertaken was necessary.73 
                                                                                                             
not take enforcement action based upon adverse impact of any 
component of that process . . . . 
Id. 
72 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (discussing the general standards for validity studies).  This 
regulation states the following: 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a 
criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data 
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or 
significantly correlated with important elements of job performance.  
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a 
content validity study should consist of data showing that the content 
of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of 
performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.  
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure through a 
construct validity study should consist of data showing that the 
procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable 
characteristics which have been determined to be important in 
successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be 
evaluated. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Simeon, supra note 68, at 486–87 (discussing the three types of 
validity studies).  Simeon explains that: 
Construct validity, the most difficult and least used validation method, 
attempts to identify a psychological trait or characteristic (a construct) 
which is the basis for successful job performance and then devises a 
selection procedure that measures the presence and degree of that 
characteristic.  Content validity, as the name implies, isolates 
representative samples of important parts of the job itself and utilizes 
tests that measure actual performance of those job components.  
Criterion-related validity is the most popular measure of the job-
relatedness of a test. 
 Criterion-related validity is the statistical relationship between 
scores on a test and the objective measures or criteria of job 
performance. 
Simeon, supra note 68, at 486–87 (footnotes omitted). 
73 Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (2009); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (mandating that the strong basis in evidence standard be 
met in employment cases of disparate impact).  In order to uphold an affirmative program 
under strict scrutiny, there must be a ―strong basis in evidence‖ of past discrimination by 
the employer to support the conclusion that remedial action is necessary.  Croson, 488 U.S. 
at 500. 
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C. The “Strong Basis in Evidence” Standard 
The Supreme Court first introduced the ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
standard in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson—a voluntary affirmative 
action case that was challenged on equal protection grounds.74  The 
―strong basis in evidence‖ standard is a condition of proof that an 
employer must demonstrate to validate voluntary affirmative action.75  
Since Croson, courts have grappled with defining the standard and 
applying it to disparate impact claims under Title VII.76  In 2009, the 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify what an employer must 
demonstrate in order to meet the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard; 
however, the Court did not elaborate on what the standard requires.77 
1. The Foundational Case:  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
In Croson, the city adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan, 
which required ―prime contractors to whom the city awarded 
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of 
the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises.‖78  According 
to the city‘s data, minorities received only 0.67 percent of city contract 
dollars despite comprising fifty percent of the local population.79  The 
city believed the affirmative action program was a valid remedial plan 
intended to combat the lingering effects of past discrimination.80  
Challenging the plan as violating the Equal Protection Clause, other 
                                                 
74 Id. at 469. 
75 Id. at 500. 
76 See infra notes 77–101 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches courts 
have taken toward the strong basis in evidence standard); see also Dereck M. Alphran, 
Proving Discrimination After Croson and Adarand:  If It Walks Like a Duck, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 
887, 889–90 (2003) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the effects of Croson on 
subsequent discrimination cases and explaining that the application of the strong basis in 
evidence standard is strict in theory and fatal in fact).  But see Schwartz, supra note 42, at 
682–83 (―Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court‘s affirmative action decisions 
have resembled the ‗push-me-pull-you‘ of the Doctor Doolittle stories, the donkey with a 
head at both ends and no tail.  Case after case yielded only plurality opinions and 
judgments without a unified rationale.‖). 
77 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662 (internal quotations omitted). 
78 Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.  The plan defined a minority business enterprise as a business 
owned and controlled by at least fifty-one percent minority group members.  Id. at 478.  
The plan was remedial in nature and implemented for the purpose of promoting greater 
minority business participation in public construction projects.  Id. 
79 Id. at 480. 
80 Id.  The Court reasoned that a generalized assertion of past discrimination in an entire 
industry is not a sufficient justification because it is not specific enough to identify the 
scope of the injury incurred and has no logical stopping point.  Id. at 498. 
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construction bidders brought suit.81  The Court struck down the city‘s 
plan, holding that state or local governments that set aside a portion of 
public contract dollars exclusively for minority-owned firms must show 
a ―strong basis in evidence‖ for concluding that such remedial action 
was necessary.82  Because the city could not ascertain how many 
minority enterprises were present in the local construction market and 
could not establish the level of minority participation in city construction 
projects, the Court found that the city did not demonstrate a strong basis 
in evidence that necessitated remedial action.83 
                                                 
81 Id. at 481.  The Court found that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that ―[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖  Id. at 493.  The Court struck down the 
City‘s affirmative action plan, reasoning that it ―denies certain citizens the opportunity to 
compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.‖  Id.  But see 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (holding that a 
voluntary affirmative action program that promoted a female candidate to road dispatcher 
did not violate Title VII because it was undertaken to remedy work force imbalances in a 
traditionally segregated job category and it did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of 
male employees); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 
(1979) (upholding an employer‘s voluntary quota system under Title VII as a reasonable 
measure to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy).  See 
BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 44, § 5:25 (discussing what the Supreme Court 
considered sufficient to demonstrate a remedial purpose in the cases of Weber and Johnson).  
Bodensteiner and Levinson explain: 
Weber established that in order to withstand a Title VII challenge, a 
voluntary affirmative action program:  (1) should be enacted for a 
remedial purpose, i.e., to eliminate traditional race discrimination in a 
particular industry; and (2) should be flexible, temporary, and not 
unnecessarily destructive of nonminority rights. . . . The Supreme 
Court‘s position, as reflected in Johnson, would appear to mandate 
statistics regarding the specific labor force if the job requires special 
expertise but to allow general population or area labor market statistics 
for other jobs. 
Id. at 499. 
82 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.  The Court noted that none of the following were sufficient to 
establish a strong basis in evidence standard that a thirty-percent quota was necessary: 
(1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents 
of the measure stated their views that there had been past 
discrimination in the construction industry; (3) minority businesses 
received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city while minorities 
constituted 50% of the city‘s population; (4) there were very few 
minority contractors in local and state contractors‘ associations; and (5) 
in 1977, Congress made a determination that the effects of past 
discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction 
industry nationally. 
Id. 
83 Id. at 510.  The Court reasoned that it is misplaced to rely on the disparity between the 
number of prime contracts awarded to minority firms and the minority population of 
Richmond.  Id. at 501.  The Court explains, ―where special qualifications are necessary, the 
relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be 
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As noted in Croson, evidence of past societal discrimination does not 
satisfy the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard.84  Instead, an employer 
must present statistical evidence of an under-representation of minority 
candidates, which is based on comparison with the percentage of 
qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool comprised of all persons 
qualified for the position at issue.85  Employers may also introduce 
                                                                                                             
the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.‖  Id. at 501–02.  
However, the Court acknowledges that evidence of gross statistical disparities alone may 
constitute a prima facie showing of a discriminatory practice under Title VII in the 
appropriate case.  Id.; see also Lisa E. Chang, Remedial Purpose and Affirmative Action:  False 
Limits and Real Harms, 16 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 59, 64 (1997) (explaining the logic behind the 
remedial purpose requirement for affirmative action programs such as those discussed in 
Croson).  Chang explains that 
[t]he Croson plurality ultimately endorsed a remedial purpose 
requirement neither so broad as to encompass societal discrimination, 
nor so narrow as to require the identification of specific victims of 
specific instances of discrimination; it endorsed a view of remedial 
purpose requiring a ―strong basis in evidence‖ of ―identified 
discrimination.‖ 
Chang, supra, at 64. 
84 Croson, 488 U.S. at 498; see also H. Lee Sarokin, Jane K. Babin & Allison H. Goddard, 
Has Affirmative Action Been Negated?  A Closer Look at Public Employment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV 575, 608–09 (2000) (explaining the strong basis in evidence standard typically requires 
statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, or prior judicial findings). 
85 See United Black Firefighters Ass‘n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1011 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(―Where a gross disparity exists between the expected percentage of minorities selected 
and the actual percentage of minorities selected, then prima facie proof exists to 
demonstrate intentional discrimination in the selection of minorities to those particular 
positions.‖); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussing the 
importance of using the relevant statistical pool to determine whether a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination exists).  But see Maryland Troopers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 
F.2d 1072, 1077–78 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the State of Maryland did not meet the 
strong basis in evidence standard because the statistics did not amount to a gross statistical 
disparity); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 409 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that remote 
and outdated evidence cannot satisfy the strong basis in evidence standard).  See Sarokin, 
supra note 84, at 609 (explaining that an appropriate statistical analysis compares the 
percentage of minorities working for the public employer with the percentage of minorities 
in the applicable geographic area who possess the skills necessary for the particular job or 
promotion); see also John Cocchi Day, Comment, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action:  
Reflections on a Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 
90–91 (2001) (discussing the different approaches courts have taken toward defining the 
strong basis in evidence standard).  The courts have taken three approaches toward 
defining the strong basis in evidence standard.  Day, supra note 85, at 90.  First, ―most 
courts fail to engage the task at all.‖  Id.  Second, ―some courts adopt an explicitly 
deferential standard.‖  This is discernible either in very general terms, or by explicitly 
adopting the ‗approaching a prima facie . . . statutory violation‘ standard.  Id.  Third, ―some 
courts isolate a prima facie statutory violation as the benchmark of a ‗strong basis in 
evidence.‘‖  Id.  Although there is no clear standard for a strong basis in evidence, most 
successful claims of discrimination involve a statistical showing of disparity, which is 
calculated by comparing the employer‘s work force with the composition of the ―relevant‖ 
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anecdotal evidence and prior judicial findings to demonstrate a strong 
basis in evidence for their remedial measures.86  The circuit courts have 
primarily relied on statistics, anecdotal evidence, and prior judicial 
findings when analyzing disparate impact cases.87 
2. The Circuit Court of Appeals‘ Application of the ―Strong Basis in 
Evidence‖ Standard 
Following Croson, circuit courts have differed on the type and the 
amount of proof the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard mandates.88  In 
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit held that the City police 
                                                                                                             
local population.  Id. at 92.  However, a general disparity between the percentage of 
protected class employees in a particular profession and the raw percentage of class 
members in a regional labor pool cannot be a strong basis in evidence.  Id. at 97.  Several 
jurisdictions have accepted the two or three standard deviations rule as an adequate 
measure of statistical disparity, typically finding a strong basis for remedial action existing 
where the disparity is greater than two or three standard deviations.  Id. at 94. 
86 See Sarokin, supra note 84, at 609 (describing the potential evidentiary requirements 
under the strong basis in evidence standard); see, e.g., Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. 
City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding city‘s affirmative action plan based 
on a finding of compelling interest where the history of racial discrimination by the Boston 
Police Department was documented in several First Circuit opinions). 
87 See cases cited supra note 85. 
88 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a section of the Ohio Minority Business Enterprise Act (―MBEA‖) 
providing for racial and ethnic preferences in state construction contracts could not be 
upheld by the strong basis in evidence standard because the statistics used did not 
distinguish minority construction contractors from minority businesses generally); Md. 
Troopers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that that 
statistical evidence showing disparity between minority percentages in state police and 
minorities among state residents who were minimally qualified to be state troopers did not 
warrant a race-conscious remedy); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 
1990) (holding that statistics offered by the City to justify its affirmative action plan failed 
to satisfy the strong basis in evidence standard by failing to define the relevant statistical 
pool); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (commenting that ―the linchpin of the Croson analysis . . .  [is] that governments 
must ‗identify discrimination with some specificity before they may use race-conscious 
relief;‘ explicit ‗findings of a constitutional or statutory violation must be made‘‖); Carvin, 
supra note 59, at 1155 (describing the difficult burdens employers must meet when 
defending an employment practice as being job related and consistent with business 
necessity); Donze, supra note 58, at 785 (detailing the different approaches circuit courts 
have taken toward the strong basis in evidence standard).  See generally Karen M. Winter, 
Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater and Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City of 
Denver:  Breathing Life Into Croson’s Passive Participant Model, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 469, 478–79 
(2005) (discussing that Croson established that a ―governmental actor must provide a strong 
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action is necessary‖).  However, ―the 
application of the rule has produced conflicting results.‖  Id. at 478.  ―Unfortunately, Croson 
did not offer guidance as to what amount and type of factual showing would provide a 
strong basis in evidence that discrimination existed in a particular industry.‖  Id. at 478–79. 
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division met the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard where the disparity 
in black policemen expected to be hired and those actually hired was 
substantial enough to create an inference of discrimination.89  The court‘s 
analysis explained that a claim of past discrimination in a particular 
industry would not suffice.90  The court next explained that the proper 
statistical comparison was between the race and gender of the Cincinnati 
Police Division and the race and gender of the relevant qualified labor 
market.91  The City presented statistical evidence using the standard 
deviation model,92 which measures the probability that a result is a 
                                                 
89 959 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1992) (―[W]here special qualifications are necessary, the 
relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be 
the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.‖); see also Rutherford v. 
City of Cleveland, 179 Fed. Appx. 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2006) (ruling on a Title VII case brought 
by non-minority applicants who claimed they had been denied the position of police patrol 
officer and consequently filed claims of reverse discrimination and disparate treatment 
against the City of Cleveland, which had implemented a consent decree allowing for a 
race-based plan to advance the hiring and promotion of minority police patrol officers).  In 
Rutherford, the court held that the police department had neither engaged in reverse 
discrimination nor violated the disparate treatment provision of Title VII.  Rutherford, 179 
Fed. Appx. at 384.  The court started its analysis by acknowledging that the party 
defending a race-based remedy bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there was a 
strong basis in evidence justifying the remedy.  Id. at 373.  The court acknowledged that 
establishing a strong basis in evidence is not an easy burden to meet—the only cases found 
to justify a narrowly tailored race-based remedy are those that expose discriminatory 
conduct that is persistent, obstinate, and routine.  Id. at 374.  The court reasoned that the 
City‘s own admission of its history of discriminating against minorities in hiring—a 
position it fought against in litigation for a number of years—is persuasive evidence of 
pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.  Id.  Moreover, a party can 
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence by showing a prior court finding of past 
discrimination.  Id. at 375.  Additionally, there may also be a strong basis in evidence 
demonstrated where gross statistical disparity exists between the percent of minorities 
hired compared with the relevant labor pool of minorities.  Id. at 376.  The Court concluded 
the admission by the City of past racial discrimination, supported by the findings of the 
district court and a review of the statistical evidence, that the City had demonstrated a 
strong basis in evidence that their remedial action was necessary.  Id. at 377; see also Eng‘g 
Contractors Ass‘n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 907 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(―A ‗strong basis in evidence‘ cannot rest on ‗an amorphous claim of societal discrimination, 
on simple legislative assurances of good intention, or on congressional findings of 
discrimination in the national economy.‘‖).  The court acknowledged that a governmental 
entity can justify affirmative action by demonstrating gross statistical disparities between 
the proportion of minorities hired and the proportion of minorities willing and able to do 
the work.  Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. Inc., 122 F.3d at 907.  Anecdotal evidence may 
also be used to document discrimination, especially if buttressed by relevant statistical 
evidence.  Id.  But see Long, 911 F.2d at 1199–1201 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the statistical 
evidence offered by the City was insufficient to justify the City‘s affirmative action plan 
because the City failed to define the available relevant statistical pool). 
90 Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 600. 
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random deviation from the predicted result (where two or three 
standard deviations would allow an inference that race played a role in 
the City‘s hiring policies because the greater the number of standard 
deviations, the lower the probability that the result is random).93  In 
Vogel, the disparity between the expected rate of black appointments and 
the actual rate was 4.7 standard deviations.94  Ultimately, the court 
reasoned ―[i]t is only when the statistics disclose the availability of 
minorities in the relevant labor pool substantially exceeded those hired, 
that an inference of deliberate discrimination in employment may be 
drawn.‖95 
Courts have held that a strong basis in evidence is satisfied where 
evidence approaches a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory 
violation or where there is a documented history of past discrimination 
in the courts.96  In the First Circuit case Boston Police Superior Officers 
Federation v. City of Boston, white police officers brought suit, alleging 
that the promotion of a black officer to lieutenant over white officers 
who scored one point higher on the lieutenant exam violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.97  The court held that the black officer‘s promotion 
served a proper remedial purpose under the ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
                                                 
93 Id.  The standard deviation model involves a calculation of the standard deviation ―as 
a measure of predicted fluctuations from the expected value of a sample[,] . . . [a] 
‗difference between the expected value and the observed number [that] is greater than two 
or three standard deviations,‘ would allow an inference that race had played a role in the 
City‘s hiring policies.‖  Id.  The standard deviation that existed between the black 
appointments and the actual rate was 4.7 standard deviations.  Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
96 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (reasoning a strong 
basis can be established by a constitutional or statutory violation); Boston Police Superior 
Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a ―‗strong basis‘ 
may consist of either ‗a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past discrimination by a 
court or other competent body,‘ or evidence ‗approaching a prima facie case of a 
constitutional or statutory violation‘‖) (citation omitted).  See generally Cotter v. City of 
Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 170 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the City‘s evidence of disparity in the 
promotion of black officers to sergeant, coupled with current racial tensions and a 
documented history of past discrimination within the department, created the strong basis 
required for the City to determine that race-conscious action was necessary); Middleton v. 
City of Flint, Mich., 92 F.3d 396, 407 (6th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that gross statistical 
disparities may constitute a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, but 
comparisons to the general population will not suffice when special qualifications are 
required for the position at issue); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 915–16 
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a gross statistical disparity existed in the number of contracts 
awarded to minorities compared to the number of minorities in the relevant labor pool, 
therefore establishing a prima facie case of discrimination). 
97 Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1998). 
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standard.98  The court noted that a ―strong basis [in evidence] may 
consist of either a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past 
discrimination by a court or other competent body, or evidence 
approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory 
violation.‖99  The court relied on statistical evidence of present racial 
disparities among lieutenants and the documented history of racial 
discrimination in the Boston Police Department.100 
In other cases, the courts have found a strong basis where cities 
entered into consent decrees to ensure that minorities were not being 
underutilized.101  In Edwards v. City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit 
considered whether a consent decree that allowed remedial promotions 
for African American and Hispanic American police officers could be 
upheld under the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard.102  The City of 
Houston enacted a consent decree in response to claims by African 
Americans and Hispanic Americans that the promotional sergeant and 
lieutenant examinations had the effect of disproportionately excluding 
them and that the examinations were neither job-related nor consistent 
                                                 
98 Id. at 20.  The court reasoned that the Boston Police Department‘s documented history 
of racial discrimination and the gross racial disparity among ranks between black officers 
and the majority was enough to demonstrate that race-conscious remedial action was 
necessary.  Id. 
99 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
100 Id. at 22. 
101 See Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 455 (1st Cir. 1991).  The Boston Police Department 
entered a consent decree in which the Department promised to use only validated 
promotional tests and that the police commissioner shall make appointments to overcome 
any underutilization of minorities.  Id. at 448.  Subsequently, thirty-four white police 
officers filed action against the police department alleging that the commissioner did not 
appoint them to the rank of sergeant despite their higher test scores.  Id. at 449.  The Court 
upheld the consent decree, finding a strong basis in evidence based on a comparison of the 
relevant labor market, which revealed a significant racial disparity between test-takers.  Id. 
at 455.  If special qualifications are necessary, then the relevant statistical pool must be 
comprised of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.  Id. at 451.  The court 
reasoned that ―[t]he Decree compare[d] the number of black sergeants, not with the Boston 
population in general, but with those police officers with the minimal qualifications needed 
to become sergeants,‖ which revealed great enough statistical disparities to demonstrate 
that remedial action was necessary.  Id.; see also Edwards v. City of Houston, 37 F.3d 1097, 
1113 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding the City‘s consent decree by finding that remedial action 
was necessary); Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1459 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding 
the City‘s affirmative action consent decree because the decree‘s purpose was remedial and 
a response to a racial imbalance, and the plan was narrowly tailored); Davis v. City & Cnty. 
of S.F., 890 F.2d 1438, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the City‘s affirmative action-based 
consent decree, reasoning that the decree granting preference to women and minorities for 
entry level fire department positions was justified because ―gross statistical disparities may 
constitute prima facie proof of pattern or practice of discrimination under Title VII, and are 
probative of pattern[s] of discrimination where no special qualification [is] necessary‖). 
102 Edwards, 37 F.3d at 1101, 1108. 
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with business necessity.103  Organizations representing different 
members of the Houston Police Department attacked the consent 
decree‘s validity under Title VII.104  The court used a two-pronged test to 
determine whether the race-conscious affirmative action plan satisfied 
the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard imposed under Title VII.105  First, 
the court considered whether the race-based measure was justified by 
the existence of a manifest underrepresentation of women or minorities 
in a traditionally segregated job category.106  Second, the court assessed 
whether the race-based remedy ―unnecessarily trammel[ed] the rights of 
nonminorities or create[d] an absolute bar to their advancement.‖107  The 
court upheld the consent decree, finding that it neither trammeled the 
rights of non-minorities nor created an absolute bar to their 
advancement.108  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the decree was 
temporary, that it would not provide any remedy for minorities who 
failed the promotional tests, that the remedial promotions were granted 
on a one-time only basis, and that the elimination of future test questions 
that are racially biased will provide benefits to both minority and non-
minority police officers.109  Therefore, the court found that the remedial 
measure—the consent decree—was valid under Title VII.110 
In sum, the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard is likely to be met 
when the employer demonstrates that the affirmative action program 
was necessary based on a prima facie statutory or constitutional 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1101. 
104 Id.  The consent decree provided in part that African Americans and Hispanic 
Americans who took the sergeant exam and passed would receive a total of ninety-six 
remedial promotions and that African Americans who took the lieutenant exam would 
receive a total of five remedial promotions.  Id. at 1102. 
105 Id. at 1110, 1113. 
106 Id. at 1111.  The court found that a manifest imbalance in promotion rates for black 
and Hispanic officers was demonstrated and that the disparities were discovered using a 
relevant labor market, which included the number of minority police officers who took the 
promotional examinations with the numbers that were promoted.  Id. 
107 Id. at 1111.  The court found that the consent decree did not provide any remedy for 
blacks or Hispanics who failed the promotional test—those that failed were not eligible for 
remedial promotions.  Id.  Additionally, the remedial promotions were granted on a one 
time only basis and did not require the discharge of nonminority officers.  Id. at 1112.  
Moreover, the decree did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of nonminority 
officers, although they may not be promoted at the same rate as before, they would still 
continue to be promoted in substantial excess of their representation among test takers.  Id.  
Finally, the court noted that the decree was only temporary in nature.  Id. 
108 Id. at  1111.  The court also noted that the consent decree was narrowly tailored to the 
relevant labor market—the number of minorities in the police department.  Id. 
109 Id. at 1112. 
110 Id. 
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violation evidenced by statistical comparisons.111  However, in a Title VII 
reverse-discrimination claim, the Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano 
controversially held that a prima facie case of a statutory violation is not 
enough to satisfy the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard, which 
superseded prior court interpretations.112 
3. The Supreme Court‘s Application of the ―Strong Basis in Evidence‖ 
Standard 
In Ricci, white candidates substantially outperformed minority 
candidates on a promotional exam taken by firefighters in the City of 
New Haven.113  To avoid disparate impact litigation, the City discarded 
the examination.114  After the City discarded the exam, certain white and 
Hispanic firefighters who would have been promoted brought suit 
under Title VII, alleging the City discriminated against them by 
discarding the test results.115  In a 5-4 decision written by Justice 
                                                 
111 See supra notes 74–109 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit and Supreme 
Court‘s approach toward the strong basis in evidence standard). 
112 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2663 (2009) (holding that the City failed to meet the strong basis in 
evidence burden); see also Howard-Martin, supra note 65, at 756–57 (discussing the 
responses the judiciary has made in employment discrimination cases).  Howard-Martin 
explains: 
A few judges may make the conscious, although unarticulated, 
decision not to rectify a discriminatory employment practice.  Other 
members of the judiciary abdicate their responsibilities under Title VII 
because they are unable to perceive the existence of discrimination in 
the case before then.  This myopia may be the natural consequence of 
majority status.  The plaintiffs may appear not to fit the mold or judges 
may be reluctant to disturb employment process that are facially 
neutral. 
 Institutional considerations may also play a role.  Judges may feel 
incompetent to make professional employment decisions or suggest 
alternative procedures.  They may be reluctant to intervene in an 
employment processes they intuitively feel are valid or feel that inter-
meddling in the decision-making process is below the dignity of the 
office. 
Howard-Martin, supra note 65, at 756–57 (citations omitted).  See generally City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (holding that the race-based measures adopted 
by the City failed to meet the strong basis in evidence standard, but failing to explain what 
the standard requires); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. United States Dep‘t of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that affirmative action by an employer, if challenged by 
litigation, can only be upheld if the employer has a strong basis in evidence that the 
remedial action was necessary; the court failed to elaborate on what the standard requires). 
113 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.  The City had hired a company that specialized in designing 
promotional examinations for fire and police departments to develop and administer the 
exam.  Id. at 2665. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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Kennedy, the Court held that the City failed to meet the ―strong basis in 
evidence‖ standard and that fear of litigation alone does not justify 
discarding an examination.116 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg predicted that the Court‘s 
holding would not have staying power.117  Justice Ginsburg reasoned 
that the substantial racial disparities present in the examination results 
sufficed to state a prima facie case under Title VII‘s disparate impact 
provision because the pass rates of minorities fell well below the eighty-
percent standard set by the EEOC.118  Justice Ginsburg also criticized the 
Court for failing to elaborate on what the ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
standard required.119 
Since its inception in Croson, the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard 
has not been uniformly interpreted by the courts.120  The lack of 
uniformity by the circuit courts, coupled with imprecise language in the 
EEOC Guidelines, makes it difficult for employers to comply with the 
standard.121  Recently, in Ricci, the Supreme Court had the chance to 
define the standard; however, as Justice Ginsburg noted, it failed to do 
so.122 
                                                 
116 Id. at 2677.  The Court reasoned that under Title VII: 
[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the 
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate 
impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe 
that it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the 
race-conscious, discriminatory action. 
Id.  Although the Court did not elaborate on what the strong basis in evidence would 
require, it did reason that a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, without 
more, is not enough to show a strong basis in evidence that remedial action is necessary.  
Id. at 2678.  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the City could only be liable for 
disparate-impact discrimination if the examinations were not job related and consistent 
with business necessity, or if an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative existed 
that the City refused to adopt.  Id.; see Sullivan, supra note 29, at 204 (emphasizing that to a 
have a strong basis, an employer must show that it does not have a business necessity and 
job relation defense). 
117 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
118 Id. at 2692. 
119 Id. at 2700. 
120 See supra Part II.C (explaining that the Court in Croson first established the strong basis 
in evidence standard and discussing different circuit approaches). 
121 See supra Part II.B and Part II.C (describing the Guidelines and the different 
approaches the courts have taken toward defining the strong basis in evidence standard). 
122 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg and the other 
dissenters would have taken a different approach from Justice Kennedy, applying a looser 
standard.  Id.  ―[A]n employer who jettisons a selection device when its disproportionate 
racial impact becomes apparent does not violate Title VII‘s disparate-treatment bar 
automatically or at all, subject to this key condition:  [t]he employer must have good cause 
to believe the device would not withstand examination for business necessity.‖  Id. at 2699.  
The dissent‘s standard would require more than subjective good faith but not as much as 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
The EEOC Guidelines serve as a reference point for employers when 
they face potential employment discrimination suits.123  However, the 
Guidelines do not provide employers with a uniform standard to follow 
when their employment practices adversely affect minority employees 
for promotion or minority employees for hire.124  Nowhere do the 
Guidelines mention the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard, the 
evidentiary standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Croson in the 
context of a constitutional claim and the standard that continues to baffle 
the circuit courts—although some circuits have been more successful 
than others in applying the elusive standard.125  The ―strong basis in 
                                                                                                             
the majority‘s ―strong basis in evidence‖ test.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg was critical of the 
majorities balancing:  ―It is hard to see how [the majority‘s] requirements differ from 
demanding that an employer establish ‗a provable, actual violation‘ against itself.‖  Id. at 
2701; see also Sullivan, supra note 29, at 212 (discussing the Court‘s approach in Ricci toward 
the strong basis in evidence standard). 
123 See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) 
(2009), stating that the ―four-fifths rule‖ typically requires: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than 
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths 
rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact. 
Id.; see also BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 44, § 5:46 (―Public employers should note 
that compliance with the guidelines will not insulate their affirmative action program from 
constitutional challenges but only from a Title VII claim.  The Constitution imposes a 
heavier burden of justification on affirmative action programs enacted by public 
employers.‖). 
124 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (reasoning that in the 
proper context, gross statistical disparities may constitute prima facie proof of a practice of 
discrimination under Title VII).  But it is equally clear that when special qualifications are 
necessary, comparisons to the general population may have little probative value.  Id.  But 
see Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1990) (asserting that statistical 
―[e]vidence of long-lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force 
and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 703(j) makes clear 
that Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population‖); see 
also Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991).  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 established that a plaintiff must show a statistical disparate impact in 
order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.  Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689.  
Although there are no bright line rules to guide courts on whether plaintiffs‘ statistics 
demonstrate discrimination, the courts have predominantly applied the four-fifths rule, 
which was established under the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures.  Id. 
125 Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.  The Court emphasized ―where special qualifications are 
necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory 
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.‖  Id. 
at 501–02; see Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
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evidence‖ standard has become a problem because employers have not 
received clarification regarding how to satisfy this evidentiary burden, 
yet the Supreme Court continues to use it.126 
This Part progressively analyzes each piece of the ―strong basis in 
evidence‖ puzzle, starting with the shortcomings of the EEOC 
Guidelines.127  Part III.A discusses inherent ambiguities in a literal 
interpretation of the Guidelines‘ ―four-fifths‖ and validation provisions 
and the need for revisions that define uniform, mandatory requirements 
on which an employer can rely when faced with potential Title VII 
litigation.128  Part III.B examines the positive and negative attributes of 
the circuit court‘s application of the standard in cases of disparate 
impact.129  Finally, Part III.C illustrates why the conflicting disparate-
impact and disparate-treatment provisions of Title VII make it nearly 
impossible for employers to undertake any remedial action without 
violating Title VII.130 
                                                                                                             
City had met the strong basis in evidence standard for showing that remedial actions were 
necessary because the statistics disclosed the availability of minorities in the relevant labor 
pool substantially exceeded the number of those hired); see also Middleton v. City of Flint, 
Mich., 92 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding ―a disparity between the percentage of a 
protected class employed in a particular workforce or occupation and the raw percentage 
of class members in a regional labor pool, standing alone, cannot be ‗a strong basis in 
evidence‘ sufficient to justify hiring or promotion quotas‖); Edwards v. City of Houston, 37 
F.3d 1097, 1113 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the City had demonstrated a strong basis in 
evidence that remedial action was necessary, but the court failed to elaborate what the 
standard requires).  See generally Eng‘g Contractors Ass‘n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade 
Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that in order for race-conscious 
affirmative action to be upheld, there must be a strong basis in evidence to support the 
conclusion that remedial action is necessary).  Moreover, ―[a] ‗strong basis in evidence‘ 
cannot rest on ‗an amorphous claim of societal discrimination, on simple legislative 
assurances of good intention, or on congressional findings of discrimination in the national 
economy.‘‖  Id. at 907.  However, a governmental entity can justify an affirmative action 
practice by showing a gross statistical disparity between the proportion of minorities hired 
and those qualified and willing to do the work.  Id. 
126 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663 (holding without elaboration that the strong basis in 
evidence standard had not been met); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (holding that evidence 
of past discrimination in an industry is not enough to meet the strong basis in evidence 
standard, but omitting what the standard requires). 
127 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the shortcomings of the EEOC Guidelines). 
128 See infra Part III.A (examining the Guidelines four-fifths and validation provisions, 
and explaining why the language in the Guidelines needs to be precise instead of 
suggestive in nature). 
129 See infra Part III.B (clarifying the requirements of the strong basis in evidence 
standard). 
130 See infra Part III.C (arguing that the disparate impact and disparate treatment 
provisions are conflicting provisions that make it nearly impossible for employers to 
undertake remedial actions without violating Title VII). 
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A. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures  
Although the Guidelines are intended to be applied by the EEOC to 
enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the four-fifths rule and 
test validation requirements are frequently used by courts and pose the 
greatest obstacle for employers dealing with disparate impact 
disputes.131  The basic premise of the four-fifths rule is that ―[a] selection 
rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths . . . of 
the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by 
the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.‖132  The 
term ―generally‖ allows agencies and courts to apply and use the rule at 
their discretion, which results in an immediate disadvantage for 
employers.133  The language of the rule implies that the rule is not legally 
binding, but instead serves as a suggestion; therefore, employers and 
agencies are left uncertain about whether employment practices that 
yield more or less than a four-fifths ratio will insulate them from 
disparate impact litigation.134 
The Guidelines also fail to define what qualifies as a statistically 
significant percentage to constitute disparate impact where the 
difference in selection rates is less than four-fifths, leaving employers 
again to wonder whether they may face disparate-impact litigation.135  
Even if the impact is more than four-fifths, the employer may still be 
sued under the Guidelines, which provide that: 
Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless 
constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in 
both statistical and practical terms or where a user‘s 
                                                 
131 See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2009) 
(providing uniform guidelines on employee selection procedures). 
132 See id. § 1607.4(D) (discussing the four-fifths rule in detail); see also Canton, supra note 
70, at 687 (explaining that the four-fifths rule is most often used by plaintiffs to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact). 
133 Canton, supra note 70, at 688 (explaining that some courts have accepted using the 
four-fifths rule to demonstrate adverse impact, while other courts mandate the use of the 
four-fifths rule and apply it strictly). 
134 See Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(stating that the four-fifths rule, standing alone, is not conclusive evidence of 
discrimination).  See generally Greenberger, supra note 41, at 283 (suggesting that the 
Guidelines indicate that a disparate impact will be presumed where the selection rate of 
minorities is less than four-fifths of the rate at which the dominant group selected); 
Sleiman, supra note 54, at 2689 (examining the four-fifths rule and determining that the rule 
does not foreclose the possibility that a disparity of a lesser value could still constitute 
evidence of disparate impact). 
135 See Peresie, supra note 61, at 781–83 (explaining that the court can, but is not required 
to find a prima facie case of disparate impact when a ratio is lower than four-fifths). 
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actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately 
on grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group.  Greater 
differences in selection rate may not constitute adverse 
impact where the differences are based on small 
numbers and are not statistically significant, or where 
special recruiting or other programs cause the pool of 
minority or female candidates to be atypical of the 
normal pool of applicants from that group.136 
This provision creates a problem for smaller employers who are affected 
more harshly by the four-fifths rule ―because the addition or subtraction 
of as few as one employee will have a larger impact on the selection ratio 
and expose a small employer to liability but will have no noticeable 
effect on a large employer.‖137  Although some courts have allowed the 
four-fifths rule to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, neither 
the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court has officially adopted 
the rule; therefore, employers do not have a uniform standard to 
follow.138 
Despite this imprecise rule, employers are expected to conduct 
validation studies of selection procedures where adverse impact 
results.139  However, the Guidelines do not require employers to conduct 
                                                 
136 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D). 
137 See Peresie, supra note 61, at 783.  Additionally, ―[t]he problem with the four-fifths rule 
is that a small employer with a small absolute disparity between male and female 
applicants might face liability under the rule, while a large employer can have a much 
greater disparity and still comply with the four-fifths rule.‖  Id. at 784. 
138 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (arguing in dissent that the City was 
faced with a prima facie case of disparate impact where the pass rates for minorities on a 
promotional exam was approximately one half the pass rate for white candidates, which 
fell well below the four-fifths standard set by the EEOC); Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 
160, 165 (1st Cir. 2003) (referencing the EEOC‘s ―four-fifths‖ provision); Eng‘g Contractors 
Ass‘n of S. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 914 (11th Cir. 1997) (rationalizing 
that courts generally adhere to the notion that disparity indices of eighty percent or greater 
are not probative of discrimination); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(reasoning that a comparison of the ―relevant percentages—0.45 percent black sergeants in 
a Department with 4.5 percent eligible black police officers—would seem to make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under ‗disparate impact‘ analysis as applied by many 
courts‖); see also Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) 
(explaining statistics may establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination; 
however, statistics must be assessed based on all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances).  See generally Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 315 (explaining that 
the four-fifths rule is not mandatory, but is merely a ―rule of thumb‖). 
139 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A) (discussing the relationship between use of selection 
procedures and discrimination).  The regulation states that using 
any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on hiring, 
promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities of 
members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be 
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validation studies of selection procedures where no adverse impact 
results.140  A major shortcoming of the validation provisions of the 
Guidelines is their failure to consider the extremely high cost of 
validation studies on employers.141 
Demonstrating the validity of an employment practice is very 
difficult under the Guidelines, not to mention exceptionally costly.142  
The difficulty and the expense associated with validating employment 
                                                                                                             
discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the 
procedure has been validated in accordance with these guidelines. 
Id.; see also id. § 1607.5 (2009) (providing general standards for validity studies); Rominger 
& Sandoval, supra note 26, at 315 (defining validity as the ability of an employment test to 
accurately predict job performance).  Tests are used by employers to predict a candidate‘s 
future job performance.  Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 26, at 315.  Test scores are valid 
indicia of performance if the exam correlates positively with other indicia of job 
productivity, such as past performance reflected in a supervisor‘s evaluation.  Id.  ―A test is 
said to be validated to the extent that other reliable evidence supports inferences that are 
derived from the test scores.‖  Id.  Rominger and Sandoval explain:  
The courts, in enforcing fair employment policy, act to protect 
applicants and employees from an employer who uses a test:  (1) to 
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race or gender, or (2) in a way 
that produces an adverse impact when other alternatives with less of 
an adverse impact are available.  An employer utilizing a testing 
program must be prepared to produce evidence to document the four 
prongs of a valid testing policy.  At the very least, an employer must 
be prepared to produce evidence as follows:  (1) the tests are job-
related, i.e., predictive of future job performance, (2) the tests serve a 
legitimate business purpose, such as enhancing the efficiency of the 
selection decision, (3) the tests have been developed to meet 
professional standards, and (4) the tests actually meet the professional 
standards.  The 1978 Guidelines are an excellent source of information 
about the proof of the validity or job-relatedness of a test. 
Id. at 332. 
140 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(B) (explaining that the Guidelines do not require a user to 
conduct validity studies where no adverse impact results; however, all users are 
encouraged to use selection procedures that have been validated). 
141 See Siegelman, supra note 54, at 523 (providing an economic analysis of disparate 
impact liability).  Siegelman suggests, based on anecdotal evidence, that the cost of 
conducting a sufficient validation study to establish business necessity is in the range of 
several hundred thousand dollars.  Id.; see also Kelman, supra note 53, at 1169 n.31 (arguing 
that validating tests locally are expensive, often costing many hundreds of thousands of 
dollars). 
142 See Conway, supra note 14, at 319 (discussing test validation).  Validating tests is 
difficult because of the rigorous, technical standards of the Guidelines and can be 
expensive because of continued court appearances.  Id.  Furthermore, in the event that a 
test gets invalidated, the costs of litigation, appeals, and attorney fees are extremely high.  
Id.  Because validating a test is so expensive, municipalities may rely less on accurate 
methods of ascertaining the most qualified candidates for employment and instead be 
reduced to using quota systems.  Id.  Moreover, using quotas instead of tests ―may curtail 
the quality of emergency services provided by police and fire departments, thus creating a 
hazard to the community and a danger to fellow workers.‖  Id. 
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practices cause employers to seek alternatives to standardized testing.143  
These alternatives include assessment centers and the use of pass/fail 
employment tests.144  Unfortunately, the availability of alternatives has 
not alleviated the burden on employers to validate any employment test 
that results in an adverse impact.145  The failure of the Guidelines to 
inform employers how to determine whether adverse impact exists or if 
validation is needed is not the only difficulty employers face.146  
Additionally, if an employer undertakes remedial action to avoid 
potential disparate-impact litigation, he or she now must demonstrate a 
strong basis in evidence to show that such action was necessary.147 
                                                 
143 Id. at 320 (explaining that the high cost of validation has led some employers to seek 
alternatives); see also Canton, supra note 70, at 706 (―Very few police or firefighter tests that 
result in adverse impact on a protected group have been found valid . . . often, courts that 
have concluded that a test is valid have not given detailed reasoning for their findings.‖).  
A city is more likely to have an employment test upheld if (1) its test is based on a thorough 
job analysis, (2) the test is validated in strict conformance with the Uniform Guidelines, and 
(3) there is a statistically significant correlation between test scores and job performance.  
Id. at 706. 
144 See Conway, supra note 14, at 320 (discussing the use of assessment centers as an 
alternative to traditional employment testing procedures).  Assessment centers place 
applicants in real life situations and assess their responses.  Id.  Typically, assessment 
centers are reserved for use in later stages of the selection process when the applicant pool 
has been considerably reduced because of their cost.  Id.  The validity of an assessment 
center ―is dependent upon the duration of a candidate‘s examination and the quality of the 
assessors, which is contingent on the extent of the assessors‘ training and experience.‖  Id.  
The other alternative for employers is to ―utilize a pass/fail employment test, and include a 
random selection process to differentiate among the large number of candidates who will 
pass an unchallenged test.‖  Id. at 321.  However, this alternative does not adhere to the 
commitment to merit tests and may ultimately increase the risk of hiring unqualified 
candidates.  Id.  See generally Selmi, supra note 30, at 782 (arguing that if Congress had the 
will, it could enact legislation dictating the kinds of examinations that are permissible, or 
the types of justifications that are acceptable). 
145 See Greenberger, supra note 41, at 319 (explaining that the ―guidelines are very 
exacting, requiring employers to show high correlations between test performance and job 
performance‖).  The preferred course of events would be for the EEOC to endorse specific 
tests or practices for certain categories of jobs instead of issuing complex validation 
requirements which create too much subjectivity for employers.  Id. at 320.  Additionally, if 
the courts adhered to the EEOC-endorsed tests, most of the costs of validation could be 
eliminated.  Id.  Although there is a danger that formal approval would stifle innovation in 
testing, it is not clear that a nationally sanctioned exam would stifle any advances in testing 
more than the law almost does presently.  Id.  But see Conway, supra note 14, at 311 
(arguing that very few validation studies even satisfy the EEOC standard and that 
compliance with validation standards may not shield an employer from litigation if better 
alternative testing procedures exist). 
146 See infra Part III.B (providing an overview of the strong basis in evidence standard). 
147 See infra Part III.B (discussing the strong basis in evidence standard and the attempts, 
or lack thereof, of different courts to define it). 
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B. The Supreme and Circuit Courts’ Approaches to Defining the Elusive 
“Strong Basis in Evidence” Standard. 
The ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard has not been clearly defined 
by any federal court.148  Likewise, the circuit courts have not provided a 
uniform standard of application, but the First and Sixth Circuits have 
identified situations where employers satisfied the standard with some 
specificity.149  The Sixth Circuit has clearly identified that an employer 
may use either a prior court finding of past discrimination or the 
existence of gross statistical disparities calculated using the relevant 
                                                 
148 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (holding that the strong 
basis in evidence standard was not met).  Instead of explaining what the standard required, 
the Court indicated that none of the trial court‘s findings met the strong basis in evidence 
standard.  Id. at 499–500.  The Court found that none of these facts justified the City‘s quota 
that minorities receive thirty percent of city construction contracts: 
(1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents 
of the measure stated their views that there had been past 
discrimination in the construction industry; (3) minority businesses 
received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city while minorities 
constituted 50% of the city‘s population; (4) there were very few 
minority contractors in local and state contractors‘ associations; and (5) 
in 1977, Congress made a determination that the effects of past 
discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction 
industry nationally. 
Id. at 499; see also Donze, supra note 58, at 776–77 (discussing that Croson‘s lack of clarity 
regarding the strong basis in evidence standard has created a problem in affirmative action 
jurisprudence).  In Croson, the Court did not require an evidentiary program, but found the 
City‘s affirmative action program inadequate based on the particular facts of the case.  
Donze, supra note 58, at 777.  The City‘s reliance on ―congressional findings regarding 
national discrimination in the construction industry, and the improper statistical 
comparisons of Richmond‘s minority population to minority contract awards amounted to 
insufficient evidence that Richmond itself had discriminated.‖  Id.  The Court did not 
address the significant issue of what affirmative action proponents must show to meet the 
strong basis in evidence requirement.  Id. 
149 See, e.g., Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 179 Fed. Appx. 366, 374–75 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding the strong basis in evidence standard was met); Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 
160, 171 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 
F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Edwards v. City of Houston, 37 F.3d 1097, 1113 (5th Cir. 
1994) (holding the City had met the strong basis in evidence standard); Vogel v. City of 
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the strong basis in evidence 
standard was met by employers); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm‘n, 979 F.2d 721, 
726 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 450–51 (1st Cir. 1991) (same); see 
also Donze, supra note 58, at 793 (articulating that in Croson, Justice O‘ Connors‘ lack of 
clarity makes the strong basis in evidence standard less than clear).  But see, e.g., Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (holding that the strong basis in evidence standard 
was not met); Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500 (same); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Def., 262 
F.3d 1306, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding the strong basis in evidence standard was not 
satisfied); Middleton v. City of Flint, Mich., 92 F.3d 396, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); Md. 
Troopers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Long v. City of 
Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1202 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). 
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labor pool to demonstrate the strong basis in evidence.150  By allowing a 
prima facie case to be established by statistics comparing the relevant 
labor pool, the Sixth Circuit appropriately adheres to the original 
constitutional standard, which allows a prima facie case to be established 
by statistical evidence.151 
                                                 
150 See, e.g., Rutherford, 179 Fed. Appx. at 374–75 (holding the admission by the City of 
past racial discrimination, supported by the findings of the district court and a review of 
the statistical evidence, were enough to demonstrate that the remedial action undertaken 
was necessary; therefore, satisfying the strong basis in evidence standard); Vogel, 959 F.2d 
at 600–01 (holding that an affirmative action plan enacted pursuant to a consent decree was 
a necessary remedial action because the statistical comparisons between race and gender of 
police department and race and gender of relevant qualified labor market disclosed the 
availability of minorities in the relevant labor market substantially exceeding those hired, 
which constituted a strong basis in evidence that remedial action was necessary).  But see, 
e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the state‘s affirmative action program for minority construction companies 
failed to meet the strong basis in evidence standard because Ohio‘s statistical comparison 
was overly broad, failing to take into account the percentage of minority-owned businesses 
that were construction companies and how many were qualified to perform state 
construction contracts); Middleton, 92 F.3d at 406 (holding that a ―disparity between the 
percentage of a protected class employed in a particular workforce or occupation and the 
raw percentage of class members in a regional labor pool, standing alone, cannot be ‗a 
strong basis in evidence‘ sufficient to justify hiring or promotion quotas‖); Long, 911 F.2d at 
1199 (holding that the City failed to satisfy the strong basis in evidence standard by failing 
to define the relevant statistical pool). 
151 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court‘s position, as 
reflected in Johnson, which appears to allow employers to use statistics to refute Title VII 
challenges); see also Rutherford, 179 Fed. Appx. at 375–76.  In Rutherford, the City police 
department enacted race-based hiring practices, pursuant to a consent decree reached in a 
prior race discrimination action, which required the department to hire a certain 
percentage of minority applicants as police officers.  Rutherford, 179 Fed. Appx. at 368.  The 
court held that a party can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence by showing that a court 
made a finding of past discrimination—as was the case here.  Id. at 375.  The court also 
found that statistical evidence supported the City undertaking remedial action to diversify 
the Cleveland Police Department because the record was replete with gross statistical 
disparities between the treatment of minorities and non-minorities.  Id. at 376.  The court 
referenced the following statistics: 
For example, the district court found that in the 1970s, minorities 
constituted 23% of those taking the entrance examination, but 
represented 64% of those who failed.  Minorities had a failure rate of 
26.3% compared to a rate of 4.5% for non-minorities.  Throughout the 
1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, the percentage of minorities in the CPD 
officer force tracked below—often quite significantly—the level of 
minorities in the general population, the percentage of examination 
takers who were minorities, and the percentage of examination passers 
who were minorities.  This court has found that similar disparities 
supported a finding of racial discrimination. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599–601 (holding that the City had a 
strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary based on 
statistics).  The court reasoned that evidence of wide statistical disparities may justify an 
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It is imperative that the employer properly calculates the relevant 
labor pool when compiling statistical data, as failure to do so will likely 
result in the court holding that the strong basis in evidence standard has 
not been met, as illustrated in Long v. City of Saginaw.152  This Sixth 
Circuit case demonstrates that the relevant statistical pool must be 
identified accurately.153  Compositional elements must be known—
educational background, members‘ capabilities, and other material 
factors—to conduct a meaningful comparison.154  The key for employers 
attempting to prove they meet the requisite ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
standard is to present statistical evidence of an under-representation of 
minority candidates compared with the representation of qualified 
minorities in the relevant labor pool, which comprises all persons 
qualified for the position at issue.155 
The First Circuit has also logically determined the requirements of 
the strong basis in evidence standard by using the same assessment as 
the Sixth Circuit, finding a strong basis in evidence may exist when there 
has been a documented history of discrimination and when gross 
                                                                                                             
affirmative action policy adopted by a public employer.  Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599.  Here, the 
City made the proper statistical comparison ―between the race and gender of the Cincinnati 
Police Division and the race and gender of the relevant qualified labor market.‖  Id. at 600.  
The court found ―where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for 
purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities 
qualified to undertake a particular task.‖  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
152 Long, 911 F.2d at 1202. 
153 Id. at 1199.  The statistics the City offered were insufficient to justify the City‘s 
affirmative action plan of promoting black police officers because the City erroneously 
viewed the relevant comparison as being between the total number of minorities employed 
in the police department and the total number of persons employed in the ―protective 
services.‖  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The ―protective services‖ statistical pool was 
erroneous because the composition of the relevant statistical pool was unknown.  Id. 
154 Id.; see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that Ohio failed to meet the strong basis in evidence standard because it 
failed to properly identify the relevant statistical pool).  The court reasoned: 
[A]lthough Ohio‘s most ―compelling‖ statistical evidence compares the 
percentage of contracts awarded to minorities to the percentage of 
minority-owned businesses in Ohio—thus marshaling stronger 
statistics than the statistics in Croson—it is still insufficient.  The 
problem with Ohio‘s statistical comparison is that the percentage of 
minority-owned businesses in Ohio (7% as of 1978) did not take into 
account how many of those businesses were construction companies of 
any sort, let alone how many were qualified, willing, and able to 
perform state construction contracts. 
Drabik, 214 F.3d at 736 (citations omitted). 
155 See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of defining 
the relevant labor pool for statistical comparisons to show that a prima facie case of 
discrimination exists to demonstrate that remedial actions undertaken are in fact 
necessary). 
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statistical disparities approach a prima facie case of a constitutional or 
statutory violation.156  Despite clarifying when the strong basis in 
evidence likely exists, the courts have failed to delineate how an 
employer should assemble such statistical data, and more importantly, 
when an employer may undertake remedial action to avoid litigation 
under Title VII.157 
Prior to Ricci, an employer who provided a documented history of 
discrimination, gross statistical disparities approaching a prima facie 
case, or statistical disparities compared to the qualified labor market 
would, in some instances, satisfy the ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
standard.158  However, these methods of analysis were undermined in 
2009 in Ricci v. DeStefano, which completely convoluted the ―strong basis 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 170 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
City‘s evidence of disparity in the promotion of black officers to sergeant, coupled with 
current racial tensions and a documented history of past discrimination within the 
department, created the strong basis required for the City to determine that race-conscious 
action was necessary).  The court also reasoned that evidence approaching a prima facie 
case of constitutional or statutory violation may constitute a strong basis in evidence.  Id. at 
169; see also Bos. Police Superior Officers Fed‘n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 
1998) (holding that the Boston Police Department demonstrated a strong basis in evidence 
for promoting a black candidate who scored one point lower on the lieutenant‘s exam 
based on the Department‘s documented history of discrimination and the gross statistical 
disparities among department ranks); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(holding the strong basis in evidence standard was satisfied where the ―comparison‖ 
figures for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion included the number of 
minorities qualified to undertake the particular task).  Additionally, the court reasoned that 
societal discrimination alone is not a sufficient basis to justify remedial action.  Stuart, 951 
F.2d at 451. 
157 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that compliance with Title VII 
remains a problem for employers because of the uncertainty surrounding what creates a 
proper condition for voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action in cases of disparate 
impact). 
158 See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (examining circumstances when the 
circuit courts have held that the strong basis in evidence standard was met).  See generally  
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Def., 262 F.3d 1306, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (―Statistical 
evidence is particularly important to justify race-based legislation. . . . [N]early every court 
of appeals upholding the constitutionality of a race-based classification has relied in whole 
or in part on statistical evidence.‖); Md. Troopers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 
(4th Cir. 1993) (―[O]nly where there are ‗gross statistical disparities‘ between the racial 
composition of the employer‘s workforce and the racial composition of the relevant 
qualified labor pool may a court infer that the employer has racially discriminated.‖).  
Additionally, ―when the Supreme Court has approved a race-conscious remedy on the 
basis of such comparisons, the statistics have been corroborated by significant anecdotal 
evidence of racial discrimination.‖  Md. Troopers Ass’n, Inc., 993 F.2d at 1077; see also 
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm‘n, 979 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1992) (―Statistical 
evidence of disparity sufficient to support a prima facie case under Title VII may, in some 
cases, constitute a strong basis in evidence for believing that a voluntary affirmative action 
program was required by, and consistent with, the Constitution.‖). 
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in evidence‖ standard.159  The Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
elaborate on the strong basis in evidence standard in Ricci; however, 
instead of clarifying the standard, the Court merely asserted that ―the 
City lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-
impact liability if it certified the examination results.‖160  Moreover, the 
Court disregarded the statistical approaches used by the circuit courts in 
its problematic ruling: 
The racial adverse impact in this litigation was 
significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City 
was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact 
liability.  The problem for respondents is that such a 
prima facie case—essentially, a threshold showing of a 
significant statistical disparity and nothing more—is far 
from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have 
been liable under Title VII had it certified the test 
results.161 
Justice Ginsburg appropriately acknowledged that New Haven had 
a cause for concern about the prospect of Title VII litigation because the 
pass rates for minorities fell well below the eighty percent standard set 
by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.162  
                                                 
159  129 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (2009). 
160 Id. at 2681.  In Ricci, white and Hispanic firefighters sued the City of New Haven, 
alleging that the City had discriminated against them by refusing to certify the results of a 
promotional exam under Title VII.  Id. at 2664.  The City discarded the test results based on 
its belief that the results could have a disparate impact on minority firefighters who 
performed at a substantially lower rate than their white counterparts.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court provided that under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional 
discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying disparate impact, the 
employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate 
impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious discriminatory action.  Id.  The Court 
held that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence for proving it would face disparate 
impact liability if it certified the examination results.  Id. at 2681.  Essentially, the City failed 
to present any evidence that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or 
because there were other equally valid and less discriminatory tests available.  Id.  The 
Court established that fear of litigation alone does not justify an employer discarding 
promotional tests.  Id. 
161 Id. at 2662 (citations omitted). 
162 Id. at 2690–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court for not 
elaborating on the strong basis in evidence standard.  Id. at 2700.  In her reasoning, ―[the] 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Title VII ‗should not be read to thwart‘ efforts at 
voluntary compliance.‖  Id. at 2701.  However, the strong basis in evidence standard, ―as 
barely described in general, and cavalierly applied in this case, makes voluntary 
compliance a hazardous venture.‖  Id.  Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg asserts that prior 
decisions applying a strong basis in evidence standard have not imposed a burden as 
heavy as the Court has done in Ricci.  Id. at 2702.  For example, in Croson, the Court held the 
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The majority‘s reasoning that statistics alone are not enough to satisfy 
the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard will only serve to increase 
confusion because the circuit courts have relied primarily on statistics in 
proving a prima facie case.163  Furthermore, the ―strong basis in 
evidence‖ standard will continue to be an issue until Congress or the 
courts address the root of the problem:  irreconcilable provisions of 
disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII.164 
C. The Conflicting Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Provisions of 
Title VII 
The difficult burden placed on employers to devise fair employment 
practices without violating both disparate impact and disparate 
treatment or engaging in reverse discrimination has created a dilemma 
for employers.165  This no-win situation could be resolved by eradicating 
the disparate impact provision of Title VII in favor of a more expansive 
                                                                                                             
strong basis in evidence test was not met because the City failed to offer sufficient evidence 
to constitute a prima facie case; however, the Court did not suggest that anything beyond a 
prima facie case would have been required.  Id. at 2702 n.7.  As a result of Ricci’s holding, 
according to Ginsburg, 
an employer who discards a dubious selection process can anticipate 
costly disparate-treatment litigation in which its chances for success—
even for surviving a summary-judgment motion—are highly 
problematic.  Concern about exposure to disparate-impact liability, 
however well grounded, is insufficient to insulate an employer from 
attack.  Instead, the employer must make a strong showing that (1) its 
selection method was not job related and consistent with business 
necessity, or (2) that it refused to adopt an equally valid, less-
discriminatory alternative.  It is hard to see how these requirements 
differ from demanding that an employer establish a provable, actual 
violation against itself. 
Id. at 2701 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
163 See supra notes 148–61 and accompanying text (discussing what is likely required 
under the strong basis in evidence standard and the failure of the Supreme Court to 
provide clarification as to what the standard requires); see also Donze, supra note 58, at 796 
(discussing the need for the Supreme Court to define the strong basis in evidence 
standard).  Given the overwhelming similarity of the problems many affirmative action 
programs have, it could save the lower courts, cities, and county governments an 
abundance of time and energy if the Supreme Court could provide some guidance on the 
strong basis in evidence standard.  Id.  Affirmative action in hiring and promotions is still 
used today; if the Court could highlight what the strong basis in evidence were supposed 
to show, and what evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirement, this would 
tremendously aid the lower courts.  Id.  Moreover, what is needed is an explanation of 
what kinds of statistical and other data satisfy the strong basis in evidence inquiry.  Id. 
164 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the conflicting disparate impact and disparate treatment 
provisions under Title VII). 
165 See supra Part II.A (discussing disparate impact and reverse discrimination). 
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disparate treatment provision.166  It has been argued that ―[t]he central 
mistake behind the disparate impact theory was a belief that the law 
could do the work of social change when, in fact, much of the battle to 
remedy discrimination was lost when we moved away from the focus on 
intent.‖167 
The argument for dissolving the disparate impact provision of Title 
VII in favor of a more expansive definition of disparate treatment is 
appealing, based on flaws inherent in the language of Title VII.168  Under 
Title VII, ―[a]n unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact 
is established . . . if . . . a complaining party demonstrates that a 
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate 
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖169  The 
initial purpose behind the theory of disparate impact was to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory 
practices that disadvantaged minorities.170  However, that purpose has 
been diminished in favor of the notion that discrimination against both 
minorities and majority class members is unlawful—the ―colorblind‖ 
                                                 
166 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682–83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―[A]rguably the disparate-
impact provisions sweep too broadly . . . since they fail to provide an affirmative defense 
for good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for good faith plus 
hiring standards that are entirely reasonable.‖); see also Selmi, supra note 30, at 705 (arguing 
that disparate impact theory is inadequate at uncovering subtle discrimination and that 
disparate treatment remains underdeveloped and could be expanded to include much of 
what disparate impact theory attempts to cover). 
167 Selmi, supra note 30, at 767–68 (suggesting that instead of creating the theory of 
disparate impact, a more expansive definition of intent should have been established).  
Selmi argues that the theory of disparate impact was based on two critical mistakes—―that 
the theory would be easier to prove and that it was possible to redefine discrimination 
purely through legal doctrine.‖  Id. at 782. 
168 See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 683 (suggesting that ―[t]he era of racial balancing has an 
uncertain future.  As a jurisdictional approach, racial balancing—the attempt to graft a 
protected class exception onto a basic framework of colorblindness—provides an unstable 
equilibrium because colorblindness is inherently inconsistent with the exception‖). 
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006) (stating what constitutes an unlawful employment 
practice). 
170 See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 664 (comparing the ―protected class‖ theory of 
discrimination with the ―colorblind‖ idea of discrimination).  The protected class theory of 
discrimination regards discrimination against minorities as far worse than discrimination 
against the dominant class, embraces affirmative action, and would exclude most reverse 
discrimination claims.  Id.  The colorblind idea of discrimination holds that Title VII was 
intended to prohibit an employer from considering race as a factor when making 
employment decisions.  Id.  The colorblind theory stems from the notion that 
discrimination against minorities and women is no worse than discrimination against 
white males; it prohibits affirmative action in any form and embraces reverse 
discrimination claims.  Id. 
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idea.171  The ―colorblind‖ view of discrimination produces an unstable 
situation because colorblindness is intrinsically inconsistent with the 
protected class exception.172  Considering that all raced-based disparity 
in treatment is discrimination, and ―discrimination against whites is as 
bad as discrimination against minorities, then it becomes difficult to 
refute Justice Scalia‘s argument that two wrongs don‘t make a right:  
‗[G]overnment can never have a ‗compelling interest‘ in discriminating 
on the basis of race in order to ‗make up‘ for past racial 
discrimination.‘‖173  However, instead of eradicating the disparate 
impact provision, this conflict could be cohesively resolved by amending 
Title VII.174 
IV.  REMODELING TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court has dismantled the primary approach taken by 
circuit courts by rendering the use of statistics unacceptable to establish a 
prima facie case, thereby making the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard 
an impracticable standard to satisfy.175  Creating a barrier for employers 
attempting to remedy situations of disparate impact undermines the 
                                                 
171 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780, 861 
(2007) (embracing the ―colorblind‖ mentality); see also Schwartz, supra note 42, at 684 
(explaining the colorblind idea of discrimination adopted by the courts prohibits an 
employer from considering race when making an employment decision). 
172 See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 683 (discussing the difficulty with reconciling the 
notions of ―protected class‖ discrimination with ―colorblind‖ discrimination). 
173 Id. at 683–84; see also Selmi, supra note 30, at 768 (arguing that disparate impact is in 
conflict with the disparate treatment provisions of Title VII). 
174 See infra Part IV (suggesting that amendments to Title VII could resolve the conflicting 
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions). 
175 See supra Part III.B (discussing the attempts by the circuit courts to define the strong 
basis in evidence standard set by the Supreme Court in Croson, and failure of the Supreme 
Court to elaborate on the requirements of the standard in Ricci); see also BODENSTEINER & 
LEVINSON, supra note 44, § 5:25 (discussing the impact of the Ricci decision).  In Ricci: 
Borrowing from the constitutional analysis used to assess the validity 
of voluntary affirmative action programs, the Court held that 
employers must have a ―strong basis in evidence‖ that remedial action 
is necessary in order to avoid Title VII disparate impact liability . . . . In 
short, the Court adopted the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a 
matter of statutory construction in order to resolve any conflict 
between Title VII‘s disparate-treatment and disproportionate-impact 
provisions.  It rejected the Second Circuit‘s position that establishing a 
prima facie disparate-impact case alone justified throwing out the test 
results.  Thus, bare statistical evidence of racial disparity, even if the 
gap is ―overwhelming,‖ as was the case here, will not suffice.  
However, the Court also stated that conclusive evidence of a Title VII 
violation is not required.  Questions remain as to how lower courts 
will apply the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard. 
Id. 
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initial goal of Title VII:  providing equal employment opportunities to 
all, including historically disadvantaged groups.176  Furthermore, the 
conflicting disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions make it 
nearly impossible for employers to take any remedial actions to alleviate 
adverse impact without making themselves susceptible to disparate 
treatment or reverse discrimination litigation by white class members.177  
Accordingly, this Note suggests amendments to the Guidelines and Title 
VII in an attempt to clarify the burden of proof that the ―strong basis in 
evidence‖ standard imposes on employers facing Title VII litigation.178  
More specifically, this Note suggests that using statistical evidence of 
racial disparity should suffice to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the Guidelines and Title VII.179 
The EEOC Guidelines‘ ―four-fifths‖ and validation provisions 
provide employers some direction on how to handle disparate impact; 
however, to ensure a uniform standard to follow, the ―four-fifths‖ 
provision needs to be mandated rather than recommended.  
Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 needs to be 
amended to explicitly follow the Guidelines‘ ―four-fifths‖ provision.180 
A. The Proposed Amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4:  Adverse Impact and the 
“Four-Fifths Rule” 
 (D) A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group 
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of 
the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally 
shall be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fifths rate will generally shall not be regarded by Federal 
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.181 
                                                 
176 See supra Part II.A (providing the history of Title VII). 
177 See supra Part III.C (discussing how the disparate impact and disparate treatment 
provisions conflict under Title VII). 
178 See infra Part IV.A and IV.B (suggesting that amendments to the Guidelines and Title 
VII would alleviate the uncertainties surrounding disparate impact litigation). 
179 See infra Part IV (explaining the proposed amendments to Title VII). 
180 See supra Part III.A (discussing the EEOC Guidelines and analyzing the four-fifths 
provision with specificity). 
181 This proposal is the contribution of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions are 
italicized, and proposed deletions are struck out.  The language in regular font is taken 
from § 1607.4.  See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2009). 
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Commentary 
These revisions are necessary because the courts have previously 
had too much discretion in the implementation of the ―four-fifths‖ rule, 
which should be mandated by the Guidelines.182  Replacing ―will 
generally‖ with ―shall‖ provides uniformity in application and a clear 
methodology for employers to follow.  The amended Guidelines 
proposed by this Note would clarify what is expected of employers by 
focusing on measurability.  It would require employers to use the ―four-
fifths‖ provision of the Guidelines as a definitive rule to determine 
whether their employment practice resulted in a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  In other words, if the selection rate for minorities is less 
than four-fifths of the rate for the group with the highest rate, the test 
evidences a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
For example, if a promotion test results in a disproportionate 
number of minority candidates compared to the number of qualified 
applicants in the relevant labor pool, that result establishes a prima facie 
case of disparate impact; and the employer should be allowed to discard 
the exam.183  Although it may be difficult for employers to identify the 
relevant labor market—those qualified for the position at issue—a good-
faith approach could be taken to provide a safeguard for employers, as 
suggested by Justice Scalia in Ricci.184  Overall, this amendment resolves 
the uncertainty the Court created in Ricci by providing that the ―four-
fifths‖ rule be the required method to gauge whether an employment 
practice has a disparate impact.185 
B. The Proposed Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 713:  Affirmative Defenses 
 (b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged 
unlawful employment practice, no person shall be 
subject to any liability or punishment for or on account 
of (1) the commission by such person of an unlawful 
employment practice if he pleads and proves that the act 
or omission complained of was in good faith compliance 
with the Commission’s Uniform Guidelines, in conformity 
with, and in reliance on the four-fifths provision or in 
                                                 
182 See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the four-
fifths rule by the courts). 
183 See supra Part II.C (discussing that the strong basis in evidence has been met by 
statistical evidence, which was used to establish a prima facie case of a statutory violation). 
184 See supra note 166 and accompanying text (suggesting that disparate impact provision 
fails to provide employers with an affirmative defense for good faith hiring standards). 
185 See supra Part III.A (discussing the EEOC Guidelines, specifically the ―four-fifths‖ 
rule). 
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reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the 
Commission . . . .186 
Commentary 
Once disparate impact has been identified, employers should be 
allowed to remedy the situation.  The Guidelines interpret Title VII and 
authorize the use of § 713, which provides employers with affirmative 
defenses to Title VII liability.187  This section of the Guidelines should 
also be amended to follow the newly mandated procedures. 
This revision maintains one of the original purposes of Title VII:  to 
encourage voluntary affirmative action.188  Here, ―good faith‖ is based on 
an employer‘s reasonable belief that affirmative or remedial action was 
necessary based on a prima facie showing of a statutory violation.  
Therefore, the amendment insulates an employer from litigation by 
allowing it to discard an examination if it reasonably believes that use of 
a test has an adverse impact on a protected group such as to create a 
prima facie case of statutory violation—i.e. a violation of the ―four-fifths‖ 
provision.  This approach further resolves the uncertainty created by the 
Court in Ricci.189 
C. Restoring the “Strong Basis in Evidence” Standard 
There are many problems with Title VII and the ―strong basis in 
evidence standard,‖ which Ricci only exacerbated.190  The majority in 
Ricci took the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard from affirmative 
action law and applied it to a Title VII case.  Instead of applying the 
standard as it existed, the Court altered the standard to require that an 
employer demonstrate that he or she would have faced liability had he 
or she not taken remedial action.191  This application of the standard 
creates uncertainty for employers.  Compounding the confusion, the 
                                                 
186 This proposal is the contribution of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions are 
italicized, and proposed deletions are struck out.  The language in regular font is taken 
from 42 U.S.C. § 713(b) (2006) (providing affirmative defenses to Title VII liability). 
187 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory defenses for 
employers under Title VII). 
188 See supra Part II (explaining that employers engaged in voluntary affirmative action 
plans such as banding, race preferences, and race norming). 
189 See supra Part III.B (analyzing Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)). 
190 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Court‘s decision in Ricci). 
191 See supra Part II (explaining that Title VII borrowed the ―strong basis in evidence‖ 
standard from equal protection analysis); supra note 112 and accompanying text 
(examining the application of the strong basis in evidence standard by the Court in Ricci). 
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Supreme Court stated that statistics alone do not suffice to establish a 
prima facie case, superseding the practice of the lower courts.192 
Despite Ricci’s negative implications, the remnants of the decision 
may still be overturned by Congress because the Court‘s decision relied 
on Title VII rather than on equal protection grounds.193  Title VII is a 
federal law and Congress may amend it if it chooses to do so.194  The 
ideal solution would be for Congress to amend Title VII to follow the 
Guidelines as suggested in this Note and to restore the strong basis in 
evidence to its original constitutional standard by allowing a prima facie 
case to be established by statistics.  Although public employers would 
still be susceptible to equal protection claims, amending Title VII would 
resolve the conflicting disparate impact and disparate treatment 
provisions by allowing employers to undertake remedial (affirmative) 
action without risking reverse-discrimination suits. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Initially, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a simple 
prohibition against intentional discrimination in the workforce.  Since its 
introduction, Title VII litigation has become extremely complicated in 
application, largely due to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, in part, 
outlawed neutral employment practices that discriminatorily affected 
minorities.  The EEOC Guidelines recommend how to handle neutral 
employment practices that may negatively impact minorities; however, 
the Supreme Court‘s Ricci decision disregarded the ―four-fifths‖ 
provision of the Guidelines, creating cause for concern among employers 
likely facing disparate-impact and reverse discrimination litigation.  The 
Court‘s approach to the ―strong basis in evidence‖ standard has proven 
inadequate to deal with conflicting disparate-impact and reverse 
discrimination cases.  This difficulty demands amendments to Title VII. 
The proposed amendments to Title VII would help resolve Publicus 
Corporation‘s testing dilemma.  Publicus Corporation is concerned that 
minority employees‘ low test scores may result in disparate-impact 
litigation.  Publicus Corporation understands that if it discards the test, it 
will face a situation that mirrors Ricci, and it will likely be charged with 
reverse discrimination by the white candidates who performed well on 
the exam.  Amending Title VII resolves the corporation‘s dilemma.  If 
test results show that the selection rate for minorities is less than four-
fifths of the rate for white test-takers, this would establish a prima facie 
                                                 
192 See supra Part III.B (analyzing cases where statistical evidence was used). 
193 See supra Part III.C (discussing Ricci v. DeStefano). 
194 See supra Part II.A (providing background of Title VII). 
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case of disparate impact and Publicus Corporation could discard the test.  
By effectively allowing employers to implement good-faith affirmative 
action practices, the proposed amendments to Title VII maintain the 
intent and integrity of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and provide the 
necessary clarification of the strong basis in evidence standard. 
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